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This thesis is a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation of the phenomenon of 
addiction, particularly alcohol addiction. My thesis draws heavily from the 
phenomenological school of hermeneutic phenomenology, in particular Max Van Manen’s 
(2006) text, Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive 
Pedagogy as a frame of reference for my inquiry into and analysis of the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery. The Van Manen text is used as a research handbook, guiding my 
approach, my analysis, and the project more generally. My thesis found that, using the 
existential of lived time, temporality, in recovery the present is essentially different than the 
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This thesis is a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation of the phenomenon of addiction, 
particularly alcohol addiction. It draws heavily from the phenomenological school of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, staying close to Max Van Manen’s (2006) text Researching 
Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy as a frame of reference 
for my inquiry into and analysis of the lived experience of addiction and recovery. The Van 
Manen text is used as a research handbook, guiding my approach, my analysis, and the 
project more generally. I demonstrate that Van Manen’s approach is best for getting at the 
essential characterization of addiction to alcohol. I develop materials from various types of 
research on alcohol addiction as well as interviews with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) 
members. I use the existential of lived time, temporality, to demonstrate that in recovery, the 
present is essentially different than the addicted past, and that recovering addicts necessarily 
rethink and reorient themselves to that past in order to heal. 
1.1 Alcohol Addiction 
With rising public interest in social problems and their remedies, various academic 
fields have taken up defining, explaining and resolving the problem of addiction in everyday 
life. The topic had gained importance particularly recently due to the evidence-based medical 
agenda to explicate addiction as a disease as well as “cure” addicted individuals. The disease 
concept of alcohol addiction introduced by E. Morton Jellenik in the mid-nineteen-fifties has 
spawned various types of research in psychology, chemistry and biology, pharmaceutical 
 
 2 
science and engineering, global studies, health sciences, and the social sciences, classifying 
addiction as a disease of the body. The disease concept incited a trend in addiction research 
that (a) favours a scientific orientation; (b) externalizes addiction, moving the focus away 
from the experience of the addict; and (c) is supposed by empirical and positivist results that 
are verifiable by the scientific procedure.  
In Midanik’s (2006) book, The Biomedicalization of Alcohol Studies, she outlines 
benefits and costs of the use of the biomedical model of addiction in alcohol studies. Among 
the benefits she lists is the fact that the medicalized model allows addicts to be studied under 
the scrutiny of the medical lens, promising a hope of future cure, and relieving the addict 
from the responsibility of understanding his/her own experience (Midanik 2006:24). By 
making the body an object of study, the lived experience of the addict, how the addict 
understands and makes sense of his/her addiction, becomes lost in the positive relation 
addressed by science as cause and effect, and its orientation to curing the malfunctioning 
(addicted) body.  
The notions of cause and consequence that underlay the biomedicalized research can 
be beneficial for concretely and biologically reducing the process of addiction and recovery 
to factors and reactions. Various research traditions have taken up explaining the 
phenomenon as a consequence of a cause, that people are caused to enter into addictive 
behaviours because of social factors, or biological ones, for example. The group Alcoholics 
Anonymous has embraced the explanation of their addiction as a biological one. However, 
this orientation falls short of addressing the lived experience of addiction and recovery 
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because, although biology does affect us, the way that we come to recognize addiction, the 
way that we relate to it, and the way that we experience it in our daily lives lies at the 
grounds of any understanding or research formulation. The issues in the field of addiction 
research and its grounds in the lived experience are addressed in the Review of the Literature. 
1.2 Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The approach 
My thesis does not address the debate between the medicalized (objectified) model 
and the experience (subjective meaning) of the addict. Here, I am simply using this debate as 
an example of the emergence of the subjective and meaning-focused research in fields such 
as addiction studies that previously had been occupied by science. Addiction studies, as in 
the social science research agenda, assert to set itself apart from the positive cause and effect 
model of medical science that is chemically, bodily, and geneticallyoriented; and, instead, 
emphasize the agency of the addict, keeping its research focused on subjective meaning and 
its implications for understanding the actor’s orientation to the problem.  
Van Manen’s approach to researching lived experience is one methodology that 
emphasizes the relation between the addict and her orientation to her own addiction. 
Hermeneutic phenomenology studies human experience by examining the relation between 
the particularity and uniqueness of an experience and the universality of human experience – 
what makes that experience possible? The inquirer becomes responsible for recovering the 
universal quality of human experience by practicing phenomenological analysis of texts 
about the phenomenon in question (here, addiction). In this thesis I gather individual voices 
from materials about the phenomenon of addiction, I transform the lived experience data into 
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a “textual representation of its essence” (Van Manen 2006:36). The essence of the experience 
of addiction reveals aspects of the human condition that are not necessarily limited to that 
particular experience. For example, the feeling of being lost can be experienced during 
various actions, being lost in a book, being geographically lost, and even in the feeling of 
being undecided. The textual expression of a phenomenon’s essence is a provocation for the 
reader, animating his/her own experiences and rethinking his/her own relation to that essence 
and action. Hermeneutic phenomenology engages both the inquirer and the reader to develop 
a better understanding of the phenomenon, also in part to rethink prior understandings or 
experiences. 
Van Manen’s hermeneutic phenomenological approach draws on a long tradition of 
phenomenology and its subfields, transforming their theoretical principles into a research 
agenda. Drawing on Dilthey’s (1986) Poetry and Experience, Van Manen describes the 
concept of the lived experience as, “a reflexive or self-given awareness which is, as 
awareness, unaware of itself” (2006:35). This concept is also described as the essence of an 
experience, it uses description to illuminate the ontological nature of a phenomenon. The 
lived experience is the reflexive meaning-making members do – but are also unaware of – as 
they act in the world. Each particular experience gains its significance and meaning through 
reflection, a retrospective attachment and interpretation of meaning to a particular event or 
action in relation to a larger context of memories (history), culture, interpretations from 
others (community), and so on. In this way, meaning can be uncovered through self-
reflection focused on particular actions. For example, the action of drinking requires the 
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necessary knowledge of what alcohol is, how to hold a glass, how much alcohol will induce 
intoxication, and acknowledging the experience of drunkenness to the consciousness as it 
occurs. However, if people were continuously concerned with reflecting on every instance of 
what is happening, very little would be accomplished (c.f. Husserl 1970). It is in this way that 
this kind of deep reflection is uninteresting to people (and in my case, addicts). The lived 
experience is the pre-reflection of these experiences, the flow of life and how we live it. It is 
the task of the researcher and writer to describe, develop and analyze these experiences by 
engaging in deep reflection. 
Lived experience research examines the in-and-of-itself of an action or activity. It 
emphasizes the action’s essence, what it is and what it is not. The nature of the action and the 
member’s self-knowledge and orientation to that action emerges through the inquirer’s 
interest in reflective-thinking and the focused development of the lived experience of that 
phenomenon (addiction). For this kind of phenomenological focus, materials for the 
researcher can be anything. Van Manen describes data as “a thing given” (2006:53). The 
essence of a phenomenon or experience can be captured in texts of various kinds, academic 
sources from various fields (e.g. not limited to sociology), art, interviews, literature (e.g. 
fiction, poetry, journals), and so on. The lived experience of addiction will be found in texts 
about addiction. This kind of self-knowledge for members experiencing addiction will be 
“granted” to me, the researcher, through the materials that I use, which I have selected 
according to the standard outlined in my research question and emphasis. Using the research 
materials that I select, the lived experience of addiction will be developed through the 
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description of its essence, as found and uncovered through my work as an inquirer. The 
theory and method of phenomenology will be further developed in the Theory and Methods 
chapter of this thesis. 
The dialectical relationship between the particular and universal are central to 
hermeneutic phenomenology. In forming descriptions of particular lived experience data, 
certain essences that make that experience possible are the focus of the analysis. The 
universal quality of the essence is the focus of the analysis. By focusing on the dialectical 
relation between the particular lived experience and the universal essence that makes that 
experience possible, hermeneutic phenomenology will produce a deeper understanding of the 
essential meaning of the phenomenon.  
1.3 The Debate 
Another field in the social sciences is the agency-focused research tradition of 
symbolic interaction and its ethnographic methodology (e.g. Blumer 1969). Symbolic 
interaction is focused on the interaction between individuals and the process by which 
individuals accomplish meaning, as opposed to the hermeneutic phenomenological focus on 
the relation between the particular experience and its universal essence. My thesis is a lively 
debate between symbolic interaction and hermeneutic phenomenology and how each method 
would develop my research question into addiction and recovery. I will demonstrate that the 
hermeneutic phenomenological method of researching lived experience is the method that 
best addresses the meaning of addiction and its experience by doing an analysis of the 
phenomenon. Symbolic interaction examines meaning as something that arises out of an 
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emergent process of negotiation between social actors. As a field trying to set itself and its 
research promise apart from that of science and positivism, symbolic interaction sets out to 
research the way that the actor is oriented to his/her own problem and experience of 
addiction and substance use. Symbolic interaction promises to explain addiction and its 
meaning as an instance that is social, contextually subjective, and negotiated. It is here that 
my thesis intersects with this tradition and methodology. By using symbolic interaction’s 
promise to focus on the actor’s experience of addiction, my thesis will demonstrate the value 
of the Van Manen lived experience method of inquiry in lieu of symbolic interaction, 
showing that it can fulfill that promise of the meaning of the human experience of addiction, 
where symbolic interaction cannot.  
By using symbolic interaction and its ethnographic method in this way, I will be able 
to demonstrate the limitations of symbolic interaction and show that hermeneutic 
phenomenological analysis goes further in developing the essential structure of addiction. I 
will use symbolic interaction as part of my analysis. My thesis will primarily be an analysis 
of the lived experience of addiction and recovery, but it will also be a debate. So, while my 
project has a dual focus, the debate as well as the analysis, the emphasis is primarily on the 
lived experience analysis of my materials. 
1.4 Research Contribution 
My thesis will contribute to the current literature about addiction and alcohol 
addiction particularly by showing the problems in the current trends of addiction research, as 
well as reconnect those other studies to the grounds of their inquiry. Additionally, the product 
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of hermeneutic phenomenology provides formulations of new understandings of the 
phenomenon and human experience of the inquiry. By developing the essential the nature of 
experience, that experience becomes significant to the reader in a way that was previously 
unseen. For my research, the experience of addiction will allow both me, as the inquirer, and 
the reader to see the experience of addiction in a new way. Because my particular insight into 
an essence of the experience of addiction will be different than another researcher writing 
and using the same materials, my contribution will be unique to the field of addiction 
research. Additionally, the reader will gain the experience of seeing the phenomenon as an 
essence, an experience made possible by the human condition, and will be helpful in 
provoking the reader to rethink his/her own relation to that essence and experience. In this 
way, hermeneutic phenomenology is an analysis that stands as one possible description of the 
experience addiction. 
The product of symbolic interaction and ethnographic research is a description for 
further testing. Descriptions of processes are gathered by ethnographic researchers and 
writers to formulate concepts that are applicable to the data collected in relation to how 
meaning is negotiated. Concepts are meant to contribute to the larger research dialogue and 
tested and verified by further ethnographic research for their relevance to society as a whole. 
Concepts themselves are put into process language, and are granted to the community as the 
result of one research analysis. Although not explicit in symbolic interactionist theory, this 
method implies that the continuous verification of concepts will lead to a list of universally 
applicable, viable concepts that explain how meaning is negotiated in all human group life. 
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Instead of a concern with concepts that are verifiable, hermeneutic phenomenology is 
committed to creating a description of one essence that makes the experience of the 
phenomenon possible. My thesis will describe the essential structure of the experience of 
addiction and recovery as it relates to my materials. My thesis will show what understandings 
of addiction and recovery makes it possible to recognize addiction and recovery as 
experiences at all. It is this method that will allow my analysis to show the grounds of both 
my materials, as well as demonstrate how other approaches, such as symbolic interaction, 
take these grounds for granted, pre-assuming that addiction and recovery are experiences that 
exist. Hermeneutic phenomenology and the method of lived experience research will show 
how and why addiction and recovery have come to be understood as experiences that can be 
experienced at all.  
In the words of Van Manen, hermeneutic phenomenology is “holistic and analytical, 
evocative and precise, unique and universal, powerful and sensitive” (2006:39). To be 
concerned with both the whole and the interdependence of its parts is the way that lived 
experience research attends to the relationship between the uniqueness of the experience and 
universal, human experience that makes the particular experience possible. It is this 
relationship that drives the analysis forward. 
1.5 Research Question 
Lived experience research begins with a research question. This research question 
guides the collection of materials and a boundary to focus the development of an analysis. 
For my thesis, I will use the question, What is the lived experience of addiction and 
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recovery? to guide my thesis project. Using this question, I will look for the essences of the 
experience of addiction and recovery by collecting materials from interviews that I collected 
during the winter of 2007 at an Alcoholics Anonymous group in an unnamed city. As part of 
a larger, five year interdisciplinary project funded by the Canadian Institute for Health 
Research, “City Life and Well-Being: The grey zone of health and illness”, eight people were 
interviewed about their encounter with alcohol and the struggle with their addiction and 
recovery. Interviews were semi-structured; all participants were asked six particular 
questions, but generally the interviews were lucid, following threads that came up as I tried 
to get at the lived experience of addiction. Additionally, I attended AA meetings for a period 
of 3 months, taking notes to anecdotally describe what I encountered there.  
I will use my research question as a standard by which to select materials about 
addiction in developing my thesis, and also as a guide to developing my analysis. I will do 
this by making the phenomena of addiction and recovery “puzzling”. By treating these 
phenomena as a “mystery” (Van Manen 2006:50), it will become present to me in a way that 
is not concerned with defining it or explicating it in relation to cause and consequence. 
Instead, I will be concerned with unravelling the mystery of addiction and recovery. What is 
it like to go through addiction and recovery? What does it feel like to experience this? This 
orientation requires discipline, as writing can often lead the writer astray, and my task will be 
to develop the lived experience descriptions in a manner that answers this question and 
illuminates the essence of addiction and recovery. I will ask what makes the experiences of 
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addiction and recovery possible experiences of the human condition.  I will now briefly 
outline a chapter summary of my project. 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
Theory and Method. Chapter two begins with the theoretical and methodological 
description of the hermeneutic phenomenological method of my project. Following my 
introductory chapter, I will next develop the theoretical roots of the tradition, as well as a 
description of the method. I have chosen to combine the theory and methods because, in 
hermeneutic phenomenology, they are intertwined; in developing a lived experience 
description, thought and practice are entangled together as each informs and interrupts the 
other to make movement through the analysis of materials.  
To take on a discussion of the theoretical roots, this chapter will develop the notion of 
a lived experience by tracing its ontological and intellectual foundations in phenomenology. 
While Van Manen appreciates the vastness of phenomenological scholarship and its off-
shoots, developing how each has contributed to the history of the tradition and its 
implications for the various forms that lived experience research can take, in my thesis I will 
only develop a few thinkers that will provide an adequate starting point for theoretical and 
methodological principles. In this interest of comprehensiveness and the inability to here 
address each scholarly contribution to the field of phenomenology with deference, I will limit 




I will start my theoretical development with Husserl’s phenomenology, his 
conceptions of its grounds, its interests and emphasis; it will provide a starting place from 
which to build upon the dialogue that emerged from his writings. Then, working through 
thinkers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I will develop their own contributions to the 
tradition, demonstrating their regard to Husserl’s influence as well as expanding it. Both 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty took an interest in working through the actor’s existential 
being in the world, ontological assumptions, as well as epistemological implications. 
Heidegger’s approach, as well as conception of being, will provide historical context to the 
concept of the lived experience. Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception and the mind/body 
relation are also important historically for the development of the phenomenological tradition 
and method within which I am working. For my theoretical emphasis on the lived experience, 
both these theorists have given substantial work that will help to demonstrate my own 
approach and methods to the lived experience of addiction and recovery.  
Other important theorists will be included in my discussion of theoretical roots of the 
lived experience that will draw more particularly from the field of sociology. Alfred Schutz, 
for example, and his contribution to the understanding of the stranger will outline a 
methodological as well as ontological orientation of the inquirer – the process of making the 
phenomenon strange, and how this relates to the analysis of materials. Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann also contribute to the sociological understanding of the lifeworld through 
their interest in its necessary recreation and maintenance by the everyday member. They 
focus primarily on the member’s knowledge and self-understanding, which has implications 
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for my inquiry into the lived experience and the self-understanding of addiction and 
recovery. Lastly, in the tradition of hermeneutic phenomenology, I will explore how this 
tradition is alive today in the work of Max Van Manen and how he has developed a 
methodology for studying the lived experience of everyday members. By developing the 
intellectual history of phenomenology, and by staying particularly focused on the concept of 
the lived experience, my theory section will provide the foundation for my inquiry’s 
approach to the lived experience of addiction. 
Following a historical representation of the tradition of phenomenology with a 
particular emphasis on the lived experience concept, I will then develop the method of 
analysis of hermeneutic phenomenology. This section will stay close the Van Manen (2006) 
text, using it as a frame of reference for developing the analysis and working with the 
material. Additionally, I will detail the interviews and their collection. 
While outlining the method procedurally, this chapter will emerge as both a 
grounding for the forthcoming analysis, as well as an example of the way that I will treat the 
lived experience while working through these descriptions. Theory and method are present 
throughout my thesis project and analysis, but this chapter’s purpose is to clearly layout the 
foundational implications for this kind of inquiry into the self-understanding and lived 
experience of addiction and recovery, as well as provide a narrative about the emergence of 
the notion of a lived experience in hermeneutic phenomenology. 
 Review of the Literature. This section will cover key texts and developments in the 
field of addiction and alcohol studies. Using the method I outline in my theory and method 
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section, as well as demonstrate throughout my thesis, materials from various sources will be 
selected according to the standard of my research question, what is the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery. Because descriptions of this experience will be found in texts about 
these phenomena, chapter three will select only materials that will be helpful in answering 
my research question. I will demonstrate how each of the selected materials moves my 
question toward or away from the lived experience of addiction and recovery and my interest 
in teasing out the essence of this experience. This section will develop the texts as a way of 
learning more about my research question, but will also emphasize its necessity as a problem 
for inquiry, the key issues in the field, and show hot my study contributes to the current 
bodies of literature about addiction and recovery.  
This chapter will start by locating the concept of addiction as one that emerges in a 
historical context, from habituated drunkenness of colonial times, to the medicalized disease 
concept of the mid twentieth century. From here, I will draw on materials that have tried to 
explain the addict’s experience of addiction and recovery from various fields, such as 
religious studies, sociology, psychology, biomedicine, and fiction. Each text will have 
implications for my own research question as well as on the addict’s self-understanding. By 
connecting the threads from various texts, my inquiry will be strengthened by my 
collaboration with various speakers as well as the collaboration with various texts to develop 
my research question. This chapter will lead into my research materials as it addresses the 
experience of addiction and recovery through a historical collection of materials, as well as 
offering insights into my own research materials and interview data. 
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Research Materials. In Chapter four, I will organize my materials thematically, trying 
to understand how an actual experience, my interview data, is a possible experience. The 
theme of lostness will emerge through my reflexive engagement with the materials, 
considering the experience of addiction and recovery, its whatness and more universal 
themes. I will develop the theme of lostness through formulating lived experience 
descriptions and collecting my materials. The difference between themes and coding will be 
addressed, as the thematic organization is central to teasing out the deeper essence and 
phenomenon of my study. This chapter will close with a description of addiction and 
recovery that was made possible through the use of the theme of lostness to draw out an 
existential experience of being. 
Analysis. Drawing on the description that emerged through the research theme of 
lostness, the phenomenon of my research question will be developed in relation to the 
existential experience of being, particularly, lived time. Chapter five will address the 
description by dialectically engaging the phenomenon in relation to temporality. The essence 
that emerges will be critically analyzed to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon in 
light of its existential, temporal relation to the phenomenon, the experience of addiction and 
recovery.  
Conclusion. In chapter six, I will make some concluding remarks about my analysis 
in relation to the field of sociology, hermeneutic phenomenology, and the limitations of my 
study. Additionally, I will suggest some further possibilities for strengthening and deepening 
my analysis of the lived experience of addiction and recovery. 
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As mentioned, all my chapters will develop through my engagement with my research 
question, and will use symbolic interaction as an interlocutor, a voice that moves the dialogue 
with my materials forward, making distinctions, and demonstrating that hermeneutic 






Theory and Method 
This chapter outlines the theoretical orientation of this research project, as well as the 
methodology. Starting by exploring the phenomenological tradition of lived experience 
research, this chapter develops the notion of a phenomenon as the object of inquiry and 
interpretation – what is the meaning of the phenomenon? Drawing on various figures and 
concepts in the tradition, the chapter’s narrative will turn to the sociological implications for 
researching the human lived experience, and I will illuminate a problem for the interpretive 
investigation of meaning. Here, a distinction will be draw between the empirically driven 
interests of symbolic interaction research and my research orientation, phenomenological 
hermeneutics. The chapter will close by outlining the specific methodology that will guide 
the rest of this research project, the phenomenological orientation to meaning, and the 
hermeneutic method of reading texts. 
2.1 The Phenomenon, The Essence and Reflexivity 
The focus of all phenomenological research lies in the inquiry into the whatness or 
essence of a particular phenomenon. What is the essential experience of addiction and 
recovery? For this research question, the phenomenon for phenomenological investigation is 
addiction; more particularly, what does addiction mean in recovery, and what does recovery 
mean in addiction? What is the essential experience that these phenomena illuminate, what 
does this relation show itself as? 
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Drawing on the Greek notion of phenomenon, Heidegger describes phenomenon as 
“That which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (Heidegger 1962:51). When we speak about 
addiction and recovery, these phenomena are taken-for-granted insofar as they are relied on, 
referred to, in relation to other things and predicates, but never developed in a way to let 
themselves show themselves. What is it about those phenomena that allows us to see those 
particular phenomena as something that is meaningful, that stands there on its own in relation 
to that meaning, and that meaning is available to us for recognizing and interpreting. 
Developing a phenomenon is staying with that phenomenon without distraction, working 
through what is essential about it, what makes it possible to exist so that it is recognizable. 
What is essential to addiction that we could interpret its appearance to us as addiction? In 
other words, what interpretive work is necessary for us to recognize addiction as an 
experience? 
The notion of appearance, the manifest, is central to the development of 
phenomenologically oriented research. As a phenomenological researcher, the task at hand is 
to develop the phenomenon under inquiry in a way that it appears essentially as that thing. 
Readers should be able to recognize addiction in reading this text – although it may be a new 
or different way of seeing addiction, it should still be recognizable. In order for the 
phenomenon to appear is through writing, through working through the materials in such a 
way that continuously ask, what is this phenomenon? What is it essentially? What allows this 
phenomenon to become present to me, obvious to me? 
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Through the interpretation of texts, the writing must always return to the object, the 
phenomenon. This may seem circular, that in order to show the object as itself, you must 
return to the object, but this is reflexivity. Reflexivity is both a theoretical orientation to the 
phenomenon, as well as a methodology, as I will develop throughout this chapter. Reflexivity 
is a concept that demonstrates the intertwinedness of the theoretical orientation as well as the 
method when doing phenomenological hermeneutic research. Reflexivity is not circular, as 
will become clear throughout the chapter and thesis project, but is a way of learning to move 
within the circle of the phenomenon.  
Recalling Van Manen (2006) in the introductory chapter, lived experience research as 
a way of researching that is reflexive towards the phenomenon under inquiry; lived 
experience research is an inquiry into the self-given awareness that is necessarily unaware of 
itself. For the phenomenon, the phenomenon is given, presenting itself in such a way that it is 
recognizable so that we can reference it, relate to it, but this giveness is necessarily unaware 
of itself to people (members). If every thought was conscious to the particular, essential 
meaning of every moment, word, utterance, and so on, there would be no progress or 
thought. If I was writing and thought, writing, what is that, what does it mean to write, what 
does writing look like, I would not be able to write anything at all. It is for this reason that the 
phenomenologist must, through writing, make the phenomenon clear, illuminate it, make it 
present, recognizable, let the phenomenon show itself, because its essence is known by 
members, but necessarily forgotten in order to function in everyday life. It is also for this 
reason that members find this kind of thinking, of inquiry, of work (reflexivity) uninteresting; 
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because every person already knows how to relate to objects, the desire to make present the 
essence of a phenomenon is unnecessary for them to carry on in their everyday lives and 
activities. This is, instead, the task of the phenomenological sociologist, but I will return to 
this notion later in the chapter. 
Where do we find the phenomena for phenomenological investigation? Berger and 
Luckmann say that phenomenological sociology should start with the everyday worlds and 
lives of the members of society, saying that its concern is “with what people ‘know’ as 
‘reality’ in their everyday, non- or pre-theoretical lives. In other words, common-sense 
‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus” (1966:27). Because members 
already know about the objects/phenomena in their worlds, it is here that inquirers must start 
in order to understand how those phenomena are understood by members themselves. These 
objects in the everyday worlds of people are understood insofar as people relate to them and 
act in their daily lives. To know about addiction, the inquirer must enter the everyday world 
of the addict. How does the addict know what addiction is? What is it like to experience this, 
to know this? The pre-theoretical understanding, that which is essential to the experience of 
addiction that is relied on by addicts to know that they are addicts, is what is investigated by 
the phenomenological sociologist.  
2.2 Being and The Lifeworld 
Phenomena are found in the everyday worlds of the members. Husserl called this the 
lifeworld [lebenswelt]. Husserl (1936:104-105) describes the life-world as the world that pre-
exists us, where we all consciously have our existence, but also the world where we 
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subjectively experience the lived-world. The lifeworld is where we find objects available to 
us. The lifeworld is not necessarily a particular, concrete space, but is where we find 
ourselves existing. Our experience becomes present to us because we already understand the 
world as a place where phenomena are for our disposal and interpretation. The lifeworld is 
what makes it possible for the member to access objects and to know them essentially. 
Because people always already understand what it means to understand objects, they find 
those things available to them in a space that makes available those things to them, in the 
lifeworld.  
Further, Husserl said that the lifeworld is a relation between what is objectively a 
priori and what is grounded in the subjectively relative; for him, a phenomenon’s “self-
evidence has its source of meaning and source of legitimacy in the self-evidence of the life-
world” (Husserl 1936:140). The lifeworld is the space that pre-exists us and is objectively a 
priori to us. The lifeworld, because it is already pre-understood as a place where we 
encounter things, is an objective space that becomes real to us, subjectively-relative to us, 
through our encounters with objects. In this way, objects themselves are already in our world 
that we always already pre-understand prior to our being in it and finding objects, but objects 
are also available to us in such a way that we always already know how to relate to them. 
How we subjectively experience them is a willed experience; we decide to relate to and 
recognize objects in our world. It is because we already know how to relate to them, that they 
are there, that we are able to experience them; this is a foundamental principle of the 
ontology of phenomenology. The self-evidence of a phenomenon is the way that the meaning 
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is available to us to interpret, understand, make meaningful to ourselves, and that is found in 
the lifeworld. The experience is legitimated by the way that the lifeworld is self-evident, 
already understood, by us. Because we already know the essence of objects and how to make 
those objects meaningful to ourselves, this is unthought of. 
Heidegger further elaborates on this notion of the lifeworld and our ability to know 
and experience within it by what he calls our being-in-the-world. The way that we are 
conscious to the world, the way we experience, perceive, is possible not just because there is 
a lifeworld, but because of how we are in the lifeworld.  
What is meant by “Being-in”? Our proximal reaction is to 
round out this expression to “being-in ‘in-the-world’”, and we 
are inclined to understand this Being-in as ‘Being in 
something’... This latter term designates the kind of Being 
which an entity has when it is ‘in’ another one, as in the water 
is in the glass... All entities whose Being ‘in’ one another can 
thus be described have the same kind of Being – that of Being-
present-at-hand – as Thing occurring ‘within’ the social world. 
(Heidegger 1962:79) 
Here Heidegger is making a distinction that being-in-the-world is not something that 
is concrete. Members are not in the world concretely, as occupying a physical space or 
location in order to relate to those things that are occupying that same space. Nor is the world 
a sum total of all the things in the world. Instead, being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein
1
; 
Dasein is the being that has access to the world essentially. Dasein knows the world as 
something given before its encounter with objects. Dasein does not belong to this kind of 
                                                 
1
 Dasein is how Heidegger refers to individuals; Dasein is the being that has access to and understands 
the being of objects. A further discussion of this term is in Chapter Five, Analysis 
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being-in-the-world. Dasein is among objects, but only insofar as Dasein knows how to relate 
to objects because it always already understands being-in-the-world. In other words, 
Dasein’s being in is an existential state of being-in the world, not a thing in the world. 
So, people understand objects because they are in-the-world of objects, and know 
how to relate to what is essential about an object in focus. The experience of phenomena is 
made possible by this being-in-the-world because that is how Dasein finds objects present to 
her, and how Dasein knows how to relates to things in the world, experience. 
2.3 Phenomenology and Objects 
Drawing on Kant, Heidegger (1988) develops perception as the way that Dasein 
comports itself toward objects in order to know them, experience them. Calling this the 
intentional comportment toward things, objects are perceived through a decided manner in 
which to engage them in the world. Dasein knows how to encounter objects because the way 
it perceives objects is in a way that demonstrates that Dasein already knows the mode of 
being that allows it to uncover objects, to know how objects are. To experience addiction, 
addicts already pre-understand how to be in a world to encounter addiction, and also 
addiction itself has a way of being that makes it possible for the addict to know it, to posit it. 
In order to conceive of addiction, addiction must be pre-understood in order to perceive it. To 
see and recognize addiction, it must already be known as a mode of being. What is essential 
to the phenomenon is a priori the experience. To see a chair and I sit in the chair, I already 
know how a chair is – the chair’s way of being is disclosed to me prior to my perceiving the 
chair. “Sitting” is not the way of being of the chair; the essence of the chair is that I 
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understand that it as something toward which I can comport myself in order to “sit” or 
“sleep” and so on. 
This is the essential – the essence, the whatness of a being or phenomena; the essence 
is the mode of being that each person ontologically knows how to encounter in the everyday 
world. In researching the human lived experience, theoretically, researchers orient 
themselves to the essence of the experience, rather than attending to the object in a way that 
is already pre-understood. What is desired in lived experience research is to understand what 
that object is and what essentially makes that object recognizable to members. Merleau-
Ponty critiques other research into human experience, saying “Instead of attending to the 
experience of perception, we overlook it in favour of the object perceived” (1962:4). By this 
Merleau-Ponty means that researchers are interested in the object of study insofar as they 
have already pre-conceived of it prior to their research questions. For example, scientific 
research may explore addiction as a genetic problem; but this orientation already pre-
supposes what addiction is, it does and is not interested in grounding the phenomenon of 
study in its essence because it is already assumed, taken-for-granted. For lived experience 
research, the phenomenon is made strange, like a mystery, and the essence must be worked 
out, illuminated by working through the materials.  
Additionally, Merleau-Ponty makes further distinctions for phenomenological 
research:  
Quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of 
the object. Instead of providing a simple means of delimiting 
sensations, if we consider it in the experience itself which 
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evinces it, the quality is as rich and mysterious as the object, or 
indeed the whole spectacle, perceived. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:5) 
To bring out the essence of the phenomenon, the task is not ascribing qualities to the 
object under inquiry. While objects have qualities, it is the experience, the way that they are 
understood as belonging to that object that is interesting for the phenomenological 
researcher. Further, research that is concerned with the object insofar as assigning qualities to 
it has the result of making the object simple, defining it as having particular qualities. Lived 
experience research looks for the essence of the phenomenon, what makes that object 
possible to be recognized. To make a further distinction, the difference between assigning 
qualities and describing that objects essence is a categorical orientation. To say that the 
phenomenon under study has this quality or that quality, that addiction is drinking more than 
so many times a day, for example, is not a description of how addiction is experienced 
insofar as it is perceived through the whatness of what makes it possible to recognize 
addiction as a phenomenon in itself. By describing the experience and orienting to the 
phenomenon in such a way that is interested in showing the essence of addiction, the research 
can catch a glimpse at what it means to be addicted, what addiction is supposed to look like. 
The essence is already there, the task of lived experience research is to reconnect the 
phenomenon to its origin, its essence. By focusing on the qualities of the phenomenon, the 
object is assumed, not grounded essentially. Lived experience research reconnects the 




The essence of any phenomenon is already there, the undertaking of a lived 
experience research project is to illuminate that essence, one possible way that essence makes 
possible the experience. In other words, my research project will essentially develop what 
makes addiction and recovery possible, a recognizable experience. By doing this, this 
research will reconnect addiction and recovery to the unthought, unaware relation that 
addicts always already understand about addiction. This research grounds the phenomena in 
a way that shows, makes visible, makes appear what they essentially are. 
If members already do this reflexive work without knowing it, why is it necessary? 
It’s true; members find this kind of reflexivity uninteresting in their daily lives, as mentioned 
above. People already know how to relate to objects despite the fact that they necessarily 
forget how this is possible. The task of a lived experience researcher and phenomenological 
sociologist is to ground these forgotten pre-understandings of the essence of phenomenon 
that we already know how to relate to. The phenomenon is grounded when the sociologist 
makes away that which is taken for granted in the everyday social world (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966).  
This kind of reflection is uninteresting for the member because “the actor within the 
social world...experiences [the world] primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts and 
only secondarily as an object of his thinking” (Schutz 1964:92). Here Schutz is saying that 
actors (members) of the social world treat the world as something that doesn’t need to be 
thought. While actors find their object present to them in their social world, because they 
already find them there and understand how they are, thinking becomes secondary to acting. 
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Thinking about what is essential to objects is something that is pre-understood by the actor, 
so thinking about what some thing is or what it means does not have to be worked out 
because it is already given. For the phenomenological sociologist, this is the work that is 
interesting because it will expose the essence of the object under study as well as socially 
connect it to our being in the world.  
2.4 Meaning and Objects 
Building on Schutz’s phenomenology, Berger and Luckmann describe the way that 
ontology and meaning can be researched sociologically: 
 A ‘sociology of knowledge’ will have to deal not only with the 
empirical variety of ‘knowledge’ in human societies, but also 
with the processes by which any body of ‘knowledge’ comes to 
be socially established as ‘reality’. (Berger & Luckmann 
1966:15) 
Phenomenological sociology’s mandate is to reconnect the empirical knowledge of 
the everyday (as well as science, history, and other varieties of bodies of knowledge) to the 
unthought essences that make it possible for the individual and groups to recognize that 
knowledge. Phenomenological sociology must stay close to its phenomenon of study, be it in 
any body of knowledge, in order to develop its grounds, what makes it essentially possible. 
Additionally, Berger and Luckmann state that phenomenological sociology is interested in 
reconnecting the phenomenon to its whatness insofar as it demonstrates how that knowledge 
is and becomes a reality. Reality, as something shared, is social for phenomenological 
sociology because reality is continuously maintained and sustained by people in the social 
world. The focus on the social world is to show how the essence is dialogically something 
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that a) is a priori to the conceiving of an object that makes its perceiving possible, 
reconnecting the phenomenon to its origins, but also b) that the essence is social, created by 
interaction and the group. 
It is here that symbolic interaction has oriented to the social construction of reality 
and knowledge rather than this phenomenological reading of Berger and Luckmann. For 
symbolic interaction, their reading starts with the desire to demonstrate the processes by 
which knowledge becomes reality; they focus on the creation as an empirical problem. 
Symbolic interaction examines the processes by which things become real to people through 
the assumption that meaning is not before the interpretation, but that meaning emerges 
throughout and after the interpretation process, through negotiation.  
The first premise is that human beings act towards things on 
the basis of the meanings they have for them…. The second 
premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or 
arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s 
fellows.  The third premise is that these meanings are handled 
in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the 
person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer 
1969:2) 
For Blumer, meaning emerges from interpretation and social interaction. A chair is 
something to sit on because a person has learned from others that a chair is called a chair and 
it holds that particular meaning as something to sit on. If a person knows that the chair’s 
meaning is something to sit on, he will act toward that chair on that basis: he will sit in the 
chair. Symbolic interaction says that the meaning of an object does not exist prior to the 
social group’s use of that object. Objects gain meaning through the lines of action, the use, 
people direct toward those objects (Blumer 1969). It is in this way that meaning is 
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negotiated; people approach new objects in such a way that meaning can be ascribed based 
on the social group’s way of acting toward that new object. Meaning arises from the 
interaction with others as well as with the object. Meaning is not something given by the 
object’s thingness; it is not something that pre-exists the object and is pre-understood by 
Dasein; meaning is created and negotiated by people, their interaction and their use of 
objects.   
Symbolic interaction’s research focus is on the process by which meaning is created, 
negotiated and emerges through interaction. To think of symbolic interaction as a sociology 
of knowledge, knowledge would be treated like an object. The way people use and act 
towards knowledge would be studied through a participant observation method of direct 
examination (Blumer 1969). This method is oriented to documenting how this process of 
negotiation occurs in regard to its object of study, knowledge, and concepts that illustrate the 
process would be developed that reflect and viable to the data collected in the study. The 
concepts are developed for further testing. Blumer suggests that all assumptions about the 
social world would be tested and retested to ensure that the concepts are empirically viable 
and could be empirically validated through further direct examination.  
This method, however, one that is directed towards meaning in such a way that it can 
only be empirically accounted for by testing does not reconnect the meaning to the 
unthought. What it is that makes it possible for particular objects to be familiar in such a way 
that we know how to use them? If I see a chair, what was it that made it possible for the 
object-to-sit-on to be conceived of prior to its creation or use? Symbolic interaction cannot 
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answer this question because meaning only emerges throughout and after the interaction, not 
prior to an interaction. If one group held that a chair was something to sleep in and another 
group stated that a chair is something to sit in, and both acted towards the chair in accordance 
with these meanings, symbolic interaction would say that the chair has a different meaning 
for each group. However, this does cannot see that there was something about the chair that 
allowed it to be conceived of as a chair. The thing to sleep on or the thing to sit on are merely 
predicates for the chair. The chairness, what makes it possible for a person to recognize the 
chair as something to sit on, the thing that is given prior to the predication of meaning 
ascribed to the chair, is not accounted for by symbolic interaction. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology is concerned with exactly this notion of meaning as it relates to the 
unthought awareness and relation to objects that people always already have. 
Symbolic interaction’s desire for testability and generalizability of its concepts 
prevents the research agenda from going beyond the actual and the observable. Further, 
based on the “Sociology of Truth”, Berger and Luckmann “exclude from the sociology of 
knowledge the epistemological and methodological problems”, and call it a theoretical 
sociology (1966:26). While symbolic interaction focused on the process orientation of Berger 
and Luckmann and their sociology of knowledge, they themselves excluded and desire to 
make research testable or generalizable. Instead, Berger and Luckmann brought forth a 
sociology that could be both accountable to the social aspect of the world as well as 
reconnecting the phenomenon of inquiry to its unthought origins, the object’s essence.  
 
 31 
2.5 Lived Experience Research 
If sociology must reconnect the phenomenological object (the phenomenon) to the 
unthought essence that makes it possible for the meaning to be recognized, what does this 
grounding look like? What will the analysis or finished work look like? These questions will 
help develop more practical explanations of lived experience research. For Van Manen 
(2006), the significance of the research question is to keep the project focused by making 
obvious the phenomenon of inquiry, in my case, addiction and recovery. The question itself 
is oriented by the essence, what makes it possible to ask that question, and to show, through 
reflexive engagement of the materials, how the phenomenon becomes present as something 
that can be related to and understood in the lifeworld.  
Van Manen says that the question of knowledge “is what stands iconically behind the 
words, the speaking and the language” (Van Manen 2006:46). The speech act is something 
that has always already understood the nature, the essence, of the phenomenon. The speech 
has already oriented to the essential, making it possible to speak about the phenomenon. 
What stands iconically is what makes it possible for the phenomenon of speech to be 
imagined, conceived of in its understanding of it. For lived experience research, it is 
important to examine speech as a product of this relation to the unthought, the essential that 
is always already understood, taken-for-granted, and makes that speech possible as 
something sensible, knowable, and not babble. For everyday members, or addicts in my case, 
talk about addiction and recovery is oriented to the essential, the whatness of addiction that 
makes it possible for the speech to be understood, common sense, in a way, knowable. As a 
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researcher, I also already understand addiction and recovery; this is what enables me to ask 
the question, what is the lived experience of addiction and recovery? The task of lived 
experience research is to bring out that essence that is unthought by addicts, as well as 
myself. It is in this way that researchers are in the middle of the reflexive circle. Because 
both addicts and myself as a researcher already understand what is essential to addiction and 
recovery by virtue of our being able to talk about it and relate to it, lived experience writing 
must be accountable to this pre-understanding and strive to bring out the essential through 
reflexivity. Lived experience research already understands the essential nature of the 
phenomenon under inquiry, but must work at returning to it reflexively in such a way that it 
can be made recognizable through writing. In other words, because I am already in the circle 
of understanding the essence of my phenomenon, that I must return to its essence that makes 
it knowable and possible as a research topic; I am moving within the circle, not external to it. 
Van Manen (2006) says that to ask a research question in such a way that keeps the 
researcher open to the possibility of seeing the essence and grasping at making it 
recognizable is to make the phenomenon mysterious or puzzling. By dropping any 
presumptions about the phenomenon, the researcher can ask the question in a way that does 
not assume any particular response or outcome. The research question does not assume the 
object and its relation to other objects. For example, science would ask what addiction is in 
relation to genetics. This question already presumes what addiction is as well as where and 
how to look for it; genetics make it possible to see addiction. Because of how this research 
question is oriented, it cannot see what makes it possible to recognize addiction as a 
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phenomenon, nor how its essence makes it possible to relate to the whatness of genetics. 
Asking what the lived experience is of addiction and recovery, instead, keeps the research 
question focused to the phenomena, but also open to various relations and possibilities. 
Without presuming what makes it possible, what is essential, this research project is able to 
develop data and materials in a way that lets them show themselves, and then put them in 
conversation with one another. 
2.6 My Data 
As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, for lived experience research data or 
materials can be from all sources so long as they are about addiction and recovery. These are 
lived experience descriptions, forms of text that describe or discuss the phenomenon; there 
can be etymological origins, interviews, experiential descriptions from others, observations, 
biography, literature, journals, art, and phenomenological literature (Van Manen 2006). 
Using various sources that deal with the phenomenon under inquiry, a narrative about the 
phenomenon is then developed by the researcher that seeks to show what the phenomenon is, 
what its lived experience is. This is accomplished by orienting to the nature of the data itself. 
Van Manen says that the nature of data is a “thing given” by the phenomenon, what is 
“granted” by the phenomenon (Van Manen 2006:53). What is given is what I can comport 
myself toward; this comporting relies on an interpretation, an understanding. This givenness 
draws on the phenomenological roots of Heidegger, as developed earlier in this chapter. 
Heidegger’s discussion of ontology describes the essence of things as that which is given 
beforehand, the object’s mode of being that Dasein comport towards, and makes it possible 
 
 34 
for Dasein to relate to that thing. The nature of data then is what is being given about the 
object through reflexively engaging what the text has said and has already understood about 
the object and how the phenomenon has been related to. The work of the researcher is to 
bring this out the interpretive work. The speaker has already understood the givenness of the 
phenomenon, and speaks in relation to that understanding and how she or he relates to it. The 
researcher must reflexively engage the text as a product of what has already been comported 
towards, already pre-understood insofar as it made that speech act possible. Then, in writing, 
the researcher will show what the speaker(s) were orienting-to essentially in their speech to 
come closer to the phenomenon under inquiry. 
To bring out the essential character of the data, Van Manen suggests the use of 
themes. Themes are often used instrumentally to help move the lived experience descriptions 
toward the phenomenon. This process is further developed in chapter four, Materials.  
In relation to the meaning of speech and action, two interpretations can be made in 
my research project, the symbolic interaction assumptions about meaning, and a 
phenomenological one. To outline the orientation of this research focus in relation to the 
treatment of materials, consider Weber’s ontological assertion about action: 
“Action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the 
acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course” (1994:3, my emphasis). For symbolic interaction, action is social 
because subjective meaning is constructed, taken into account, and negotiated by social 
actors. Actors, in taking the subjective meaning into account, would act toward others and 
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objects in a way that demonstrates the orientation to meaning. Actors orient to the group 
meaning and act by taking those meanings into account. People, then, would speak or write 
texts about objects based on the meanings they have for those objects. Other individuals 
would be able to read those texts and be able to understand the meanings that the speaker had 
for those objects. Prus (1996) calls this intersubjectivity. But what is it that is being 
understood? Meaning seems to be something ineffable, something that is transferred and 
oriented to, but not wholly explained in relation to the social interaction.  
Phenomenologically, meaning is social insofar as the mode of being of the object to 
which that meaning belongs, be it an action, speech or text, is something that is universally 
understood. What is defined or comported towards, predicated about that object is subjective, 
but the way that meaning is given is something that is universally understood and something 
that actors always already do. For hermeneutic phenomenological research, it must capture 
and describe what is given in its givenness of objects and their way of being insofar as actors 
can orient towards it. This essence, givenness, whatness of the object and the way that it is 
given so that actors can understand it is already social, and is what must be brought out when 
interpreting texts in (hermeneutic) phenomenological sociology.  
This orientation toward what is oriented-to in the lifeworld is a different emphasis 
than in symbolic interaction. While symbolic interaction claims to develop the meaning and 
the process by which the meaning is socially constructed and negotiated, meaning is assumed 
in the phenomenological sense. In Symbolic interaction, each individual has their own 
meaning or perspective that is developed socially from the group, but there is no one reality, 
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there are multiple realities and myriad perspectives. A symbolic interactionist project is 
interested in describing the various perspectives and how they came about. But, as Bonner 
(1994) points out, the problem then arises, how is the sociological analysis any different than 
just another perspective? Another way of negotiating the meaning of something? How is the 
sociologist’s task different, what are the claims to truth in the authority of the analyst? For 
Bonner, the solution to the problem of solipsism in symbolic interaction is hermeneutics, as I 
will discuss in the following section.  It is for this same reason that my thesis shares the 
assertion that hermeneutic phenomenology is best for developing and bringing out the deeper 
meaning of a phenomenon. Phenomenological reflection leads to the essential meaning of a 
thing (object, phenomenon) by engaging what is oriented-to, the essence, in the text through 
hermeneutic methods. 
Prior to developing the hermeneutic reflection method, I will now briefly articulate 
how I collected my materials to assemble this research project. In 2008 I worked as a 
research assistant under the direction of Professor Kieran Bonner. As part of a larger, five-
year, interdisciplinary research project funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research 
entitled “City Life and Well-Being: The Grey-Zone of Health and Illness”, I conducted 
interviews with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) members. After research ethics board cleared 
the project, I began attending AA meetings in January. Eventually, I was able to connect with 
one of the pillars of the group, and she was very helpful in gathering people for me (as well 
as another student) to interview about their experiences with alcohol. There were eight semi-
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structured interviews in total, with both men and women. There were six questions
2
, 
developed by Dr. Kieran Bonner, that were asked of all AA members. These questions were 
developed to encourage the AA members to discuss their experiences with alcohol in order to 
get at how the AA members were making sense of their experiences and addiction. These 
questions are focused on bringing out the interpretive work that AA members were doing to 
relate to and understand their addiction. Their responses were probed further by the 
interviewer to encourage reflexive thinking and discussion about their experiences. 
Afterwards, the interviews were transcribed for further reflection and analysis.  
Additional to the interview process, I collected and read literature from various 
sources on alcoholism and addiction. I searched the library catalogue, as well as scholar’s 
portal for relevant articles and monographs using the key words addiction, alcohol, 
alcoholism, experience, disease, recovery and treatment. I began reading these sources and 
writing various drafts that helped to focus my research question. In addition to this search, I 
began to look for themes in my transcribed interviews. At first I found it exceptionally 
difficult to separate the speech from actuality; by this I mean that I tended to treat the 
addiction talk and texts as standing for something that was reality, rather than treating it as a 
text phenomenologically. As time passed, and I grounded myself in phenomenological 
                                                 
2
 The following questions were asked at every interview: 1) A brief history of your experience with 
alcohol; 2) What was it that attracted you to alcohol; 3) What kind of destructiveness do you feel alcohol led 
you to; 4) There is a debate in the literature about alcoholism as a dependency or alcohol as a disease, what is 
your take on that; 5) What is your relationship to alcohol and celebration; and 6) What do you think is the 
relationship is between alcohol and urban sociability? 
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literature, I began to find it easier to work through the addiction texts and interviews as a 
relation to the phenomena rather than a definitive statement of actuality.  
This project finally started to take shape by using Van Manen’s (2006) text to help 
operationalize the phenomenological inquiry. With encouragement from my supervisor, 
Professor Bonner, the text became the central methodological statement guiding my writing. 
I followed Van Manen’s research outline as a model for doing hermeneutic 
phenomenological inquiry.  
2.7 Hermeneutics and Engaging the Materials 
To get at the deeper meaning of the phenomena under inquiry, lived experience 
research describes and brings out what is oriented-to in speech but unthought and 
ungrounded by the speaker because the speaker always already understands how it is to 
understand what she is speaking about. For my project, I will develop the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery through hermeneutic reflection with the materials to show what is 
existentially beneath the text. This method of engaging data Van Manen (2006) calls a 
conversational relation. The conversation with materials is oriented by the research question, 
and develops an organized interpretation that argumentatively engages the materials, and is 
oriented towards answering the question. Bonner says conversation is a method that can 
overcome the problem of sociological solipsism, as seen in the symbolic interaction method, 
and that “conversation requires the art of questioning” (1994:243). That is, a conversational 
relation requires that the inquirer questions the grounds of the texts, of the speakers, what 
assumptions and understandings make the speech possible. This is a method of interpretation. 
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As an inquirer I engage the materials in a way that questions their foundations, their 
implications, and their limitations. This method is demonstrated throughout my project, 
found in every instance that I engage material related to the research question.  
To carry on a conversational relation to material and data, I will first ask of any text, 
what is the experience of addiction and recovery in this text? What is this text about? What is 
it saying? Without any presumptions, I then try to develop the lens (or structure) through 
which this speaker sees addiction and recovery within the lifeworld, how he or she 
understands it, orients towards it. Returning to the phenomenon, the lens is then “asked” how 
this structure makes the experience of addiction and recovery possible. What is it? How is it? 
What is particular about it? What does it show us about the human condition? What is 
universal about it? As I work through various materials, the phenomenon in each text will be 
brought out in this way and developed in relation to the preceding and proceeding texts. The 
description of the lived experience will show a structural relation to addiction and recovery 
and will emerge through the work with the texts.  
Hermeneutics shows that understanding is not one human 
characteristic among many, but is rather a constituent element 
of the human way of being in the world.  Understanding is not 
just one of the things that humans do but is inextricably bound 
up with our being human (Bonner 1998:151). 
Bonner emphasizes that the interpretive work of hermeneutics preserves the relation 
that individuals (or texts) have to understanding as well as the collective (universal) relation 
to the phenomenon of inquiry. When developing each text in relation to the research 
question, researchers will ask what is particular and what is universal? In other words, what 
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is this text saying that helps me understand addiction and recovery, and what does addiction 
and recovery help me to understand about the text. Further, what does this text illustrate more 
generally about the human condition? What does this text show me that helps me understand 
the way that addiction is a recognizable phenomenon in the human experience? What is it 
like? What does it do? It is this kind of interpretive work and engagement that will develop 
the research project.  
In addition to developing my materials in a way that brings out the essence of 
addiction and recovery, I will also critically analyze my phenomenon in relation to the lived 
experience descriptions. For this project, I will follow Van Manen’s (2006) existential model 
of reflection. In this model, I will use the existential of temporality to provide a frame of 
reference for interpreting the lived experience descriptions of addiction and recovery, 
working through the particular experiences and interpreting them in relation to the universal 
experience of lived time.  
The hermeneutic method of interpretation will be demonstrated as best for dealing 
with the phenomenological essences as developed through lived experience descriptions 
throughout my thesis project. While this chapter has served as both a practical explanation of 
my method as well as a theoretical orientation to the nature of phenomena, the justification 
for this method will emerge throughout the written product of this project, as well as in some 
concluding remarks in the final chapter of this thesis. The whole project will be an example 
of working through the hermeneutic phenomenological method as a demonstration of both 
the theory and method of reflexivity. But it will be throughout the narrative that the 
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credibility of this method for this particular research question will become visible. 
Reflexivity and the hermeneutic phenomenological method will be shown to be both a deeper 
and better way to address and develop the meaning of any phenomenon, and explicitly shown 
in my thesis. Finally, limitations of this project will also be dealt with in the conclusion 
chapter. I will now proceed into chapter three which deals with the current literature about 





Review of the Literature 
For my analysis of the lived experience of addiction and recovery, I will first develop 
a few keys texts that will contribute to my research question. Additionally, I will critically 
demonstrate each text’s distance from lived experience research, as well as develop what can 
be learned about the lived experience of addiction and recovery from each text. Texts were 
selected based on their relevance to my research question. Using the method outlined in 
Chapter two, Theory and Method, this chapter will expose a need for lived experience 
research in the realm of addiction studies, as well as, by drawing on the key texts I have 
selected based on my research question and standard, demonstrate how each text is also 
material that brings my research closer to understanding the essence of addiction and 
recovery. 
3.1 Etymology 
In developing lived experience research, Van Manen outlines the importance of the 
etymological roots found in the language of texts; “The words we use to refer to the 
phenomenon have lost some of their original meaning” (Van Manen 2006:58). The use of 
“addiction” has been transformed in everyday speech, as people say that they are “addicted to 
a soft drink” or “addicted to the iPhone”. In some ways this use of “addiction” seems 
reminiscent of an attraction or affection for something. But how is this different from the way 
that someone is “addicted to alcohol”? Clearly, saying that one is addicted to their cell phone 
 
 43 
is different than being addicted to cocaine. The meaning of words can be changed by culture, 
and going back to the etymological root of words can be insightful into the research question 
at hand into the phenomenon under inquiry. To learn more about addiction, it is beneficial for 
me to consult where and when the word addiction emerged in language.  
The Oxford English Dictionary traces the etymological roots of the word addiction to 
Roman times, where the term addiction referenced a legal implication, “the formal giving 
over by sentence of court; hence, a dedication of person to a master” (my emphasis). The 
action of giving over orients to a self-possessing, devoted commitment, giving yourself over 
to a commitment such as marriage. But in this case can also have implications in relation to 
the courts; that is, that giving over can also be adjudged onto a person. Whereas the first 
version of this orientation, a commitment, suggests a kind of dedication that is willfully given 
over, there is also the possibility of a surrendering to a master. The concept of a relation to 
something or someone as a master brings with it notions of power and coercion, that giving 
over can also be a forced upon giving up of free will.  
As developed by Hegel, subordination, the action of dedicating oneself to a master, 
something or someone, can be a pleasurable experience; that is, the desire to dedicate 
oneself, one’s life or one’s actions to some thing. The slave, in recognizing the master’s 
dependence in him to carry out his will, is empowered by the enjoyment of servicing his 
master (Hegel 1977; see pages 115-119). While the master desires to enjoy the labours of his 
slave, the slave is satisfied by fulfilling the desires of the master insofar as being in thrall to 
the dedication and commitment to his work. For addiction, this reading suggests that addicts 
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can feel simultaneously overpowered by their will to use alcohol for pleasure, and also 
empowered by the satisfaction and enjoyment from the pleasure of intoxication. 
Here we find a tension in this relationship to addiction. Through this perspective, not 
only are addicts orienting to the desire to dedicate themselves to a practice that is pleasurable, 
this practice is accompanied by a feeling of being governed over by that same desire. So 
while addicts may feel a kind of pleasure in giving themselves over to their desires – the 
pursuit of drinking for pleasure – that same desire brings with it the experience of 
powerlessness over that same desire, as if the desire governs them, is master over their 
actions, while simultaneously willing to devote themselves to it for pleasurable outcomes. 
The implications for my research question about the lived experience of addiction and 
recovery point to the feeling of dependency that is both overwhelming as well as enjoyable. 
For addiction, the dependency on alcohol can cause pleasure seeking for continuous use of 
alcohol, but can also be a feeling of frustration and powerlessness over the will to stop. It 
may be difficult to cease doing the things we love, even if we know it is good for us. 
To further explore the implications of the etymology of the word “addiction”, 
consider Levine’s text about the emergence of this word in the western world. 
Beginning in the 19th century, terms like "overwhelming," 
"overpowering" and "irresistible" were used to describe the 
drunkard's desire for liquor. In the colonial period, however, 
these words were almost never used. Instead, the most 
commonly used words were "love" and "affection," terms 
seldom used in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the modern 
definition of alcoholism, the problem is not that alcoholics love 
to get drunk, but that they cannot help it – they cannot control 
themselves. They may actually hate getting drunk, wishing 
only to drink moderately or "socially." In the traditional view, 
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however, the drunkard's sin was the love of "excess" drink to 
the point of drunkenness. (Levine 1978:497) 
Reminiscent of the Oxford definition and its implications between being a slave to a 
master and the pleasure associated with enthrallment, Levine’s text demonstrates the 
emergence of addiction as a word once associated with pleasure and affection for alcohol and 
later developing into a force that overpowers the addict, and desires drunkenness. Levine’s 
text brings out a tension; the distinction between the modern conception of addiction, the 
overwhelming of the will to control the need to drink, and the colonial conception of sin and 
the desire for excess. As Levine points out, the addict may hate getting drunk, but she is 
unable to control her desires and must get drunk every time she drinks. This is quite different 
than the early language of love and enjoyment of excess drinking. I will consider the 
implications of this change. 
Affection for an object entails the self-understanding of the pleasure associated with 
that object. For drinkers, they are aware of their love for alcohol, and choose to indulge in 
what they love about alcohol, drinking to feel the pleasure of intoxication. The drinker in this 
case knows that drinking excess alcohol will lead to drunkenness, and chooses to drink 
heavily because she desires that feeling. In this self-awareness of the love and desire for the 
pleasure of alcohol, the drinker is accountable to her choice and is responsible for those 
choices insofar as she is aware of the effects of alcohol and desires them. In this formulation, 
some people enjoy drinking more than others, and those who really enjoy the affects of 
alcohol choose to drink more often and drink to excess.  
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This is very different from the addict who is not responsible for her drinking because 
she is overpowered by her desire for alcohol, and instead hates getting drunk, but cannot help 
herself. The addict who cannot control her desires to drink does not intend on getting drunk, 
but ends up drunk as her will to not drink is overpowered by her need to feel the effects of 
alcohol. In this way, the addict is “out of control”, unable to restrain but perhaps desiring to 
abstain. The loathing of hate could illustrate the frustration between the overwhelming of will 
power and the self-knowledge of desiring to stop drinking. However, in this formulation of 
the addict who hates to drink, there is an ambiguous relationship to who exactly is in control. 
The addict who does not desire to drink but cannot help herself is at the mercy of a force 
other than her will power. This language removes the responsibility and agency of self-
control away from the addict, and the addict is no longer accountable to her desires in the 
same way as the addict who loves to drink.  
This tension between the language of the past, the affection for drunkenness, and the 
modern addict who is out of control, reveals a particular relationship to my research question. 
One possible essence of addiction is feeling love and simultaneously being overwhelmed by 
that love. Addiction is both the desire for and love of pleasure and the feeling of being 
controlled by that desire. The experience of addiction is made possible by this element of the 
human condition, that people have the ability to love but to also feel as though the objects 
they love have a mysterious power over them. 
What does the shift from language about affection to language of irresistibility reveal 
about the addiction literature? It suggests that agency is removed from the addict, and the 
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self-understanding and awareness of pleasure is no longer associated with addiction research. 
The addict’s self-knowledge is not accountable to the study of addiction if she, as an addict, 
is no longer in control of her desires. In this way, we can expect that this trend will be 
thematic in the materials I collect in this chapter as well as chapter four, Materials. Lived 
experience research offers a way to reconnect the addict’s self-understanding as one 
experience that is possible in the human condition, as well as reconnect the addict to her 
desire. 
3.2 Disease and the Body 
To further explore this ambiguity and relation between dependency and its enjoyment 
as well as overpowering desire, I will now consult a few texts that have sought to explain 
dependency based on the standard of my research question; I am looking for texts that are 
interested in explaining the experience of addiction and recovery. These texts will both 
contribute to my question into the lived experience of addiction and recovery, and also be 
exemplary of research that is not fulfilling the need do this kind of research. The first text 
introduced the notion of the disease concept of alcohol as an addiction in 1960. In Jellinek’s 
(1960) famous typologies, he describes various kinds of heavy drinking, but classifies only 
one as a disease: 
...That species of alcoholism in which (1) acquired increased 
tissue tolerance to alcohol, (2) adaptive cell metabolism, (3) 
withdrawal symptoms and “craving,” i.e., physical dependence, 
and (4) loss of control are involved. In gamma alcoholism there 
is a definite progression from psychological to physical 
dependence and marked behaviour changes...This species 
produces the greatest and most serious kinds of damage. The 
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loss of control, of course, impairs interpersonal relations to the 
highest degree. The damage to health in general and to 
financial and social standing are also more prominent than in 
other species of alcoholism. (Jellinek 1960:37) 
This text identifies craving as a sickness of the body. As the body biologically 
develops an increased tolerance, the desired pleasure of drunkenness becomes more difficult 
to obtain; the drinker must drink more and more to have the same sensations of drunkenness. 
The desire has the potential to become endless, as the drinker strives to achieve intoxication, 
each time needing to drink more and more alcohol. In this way, the desire could become 
overwhelming, leading to out of control drinking and transforming the drinker into an addict. 
For Jellinek’s typology of an alcoholic, the out of control drinking is what characterizes the 
disease of addiction. 
Jellinek’s classification of alcoholism is named a species. A species is a being onto 
itself.  The implication of calling alcoholism a disease gives it a quality independent of the 
action of drinking. The disease concept is like saying that addiction is similar to a virus, a 
species that attacks the body; but that species is within the body, and is brought into the body 
by continuous drinking. Analogous to a virus, the affliction is purely physical, affecting the 
cell tissues and body. Jellinek emphasizes the disease as passing from the realm of 
psychological interest, like the pleasure of drunkenness, dependence becomes a purely 
physical phenomenon. By attributing alcoholism the characterizations of disease causation, 
the symptoms of alcoholism become externalized from the drinker, beyond control. When the 
need to drink is beyond control, psychological intervention, which, according to Jellinek 
once was possible, becomes difficult, as it is the will of the body that becomes the perpetrator 
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against the addict and less so the will of the mind. In this formulation of addiction, the will of 
the mind is powerless against the need of the body for more alcohol.  
Through Jellinek’s interest in anatomy and biological causation, alcoholism becomes 
a sickness; alcoholism is progressive, he says, and transforms the heavy drinker into a 
physically dependent drinker. The physically dependent drinker is no longer in control of his 
drinking, it is beyond his control, and his body now relies on the presence of alcohol in its 
operation and functioning. In this way, normality is one who is in control of her drinking, 
who is not physically ailed and dependent on alcohol consumption. The addict now suffers 
from somatic constraints, that the body is overpowering the mind, craving alcohol, and 
functioning irregularly. The interest in causation in this literature forces the addict into a sick 
role; one who is beyond control of the disease.  
However, in Jellinek’s diction he declares the addict’s drinking behaviour is out of 
control, not beyond control. Out of control suggests a closer relation to the mind, an 
overpowering of will, rather than the biology’s overpowering of the body. The overpowering 
of will points to an ethical dilemma, one where the addict is actively engaged in 
understanding and appeasing his desires to drink for the pleasure of alcohol. Desire is a self-
knowledge of want and need, leading to pleasure. If the addict is orienting to his desires, he 
has a self-understanding of those needs; whereas if it were a bodily affliction he may not 
understand his reactions and symptoms. Here, in Jellinek’s own typology, is an ambiguity 
between his description of its causes, what he calls a biological nature, and the struggle for 
the addict, the understandings of desire and the loss of control.  
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Is the physical dependence intertwined with this out of control desire? One can have a 
self-knowledge of the body’s reliance on food and hunger, and then desire food. This 
medicalized characterization of drinking, that it is like a virus, changing cells tissue 
(metabolic functions, and so on), causing physical dependence on alcohol, can become self-
aware to the addict. But this desire is overwhelming; the addict is engaged in this struggle, 
not merely victim to it. What is the self-understanding of this phenomenon? As I will 
demonstrate throughout this chapter, this kind of research, classifying addiction as a disease 
of the body, is not lived experience research. The self-understanding of the addict is not 
taken into consideration in the narrative of the addiction and dependency explanation. As I 
have developed in the Jellinek literature, the possibility of this model is tied to the experience 
of actions that are “out of control”. Removing the engagement of the addict by externalizing 
the relation to the experience as one of the body omits the understanding of the will and the 
self-knowledge of that will being overwhelmed by a desire. The omission is evident in the 
implications of the biological model of dependency and disease and its relation to an out of 
control desire, as developed above. This omission, as present in literature following this 
disease concept model, is in need of further development of the self-knowledge that is 
present in the desire for more alcohol. Current implications suggest that, like hunger, the 
need for more alcohol is merely an experience that can be indicated to self-awareness – my 
stomach can growl and I can understand that I am hungry – but this concept does not yet 
develop self-awareness to the full extent of the implied struggle of the mind over the body – 
to refrain from feeding my hunger or deny my desire for alcohol. 
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Jellinek’s disease concept radically changed addiction studies when it was first 
published; and, since, has spawned an entire field of medically related research on the topic 
of addiction. However, the implications for an understanding of addiction that is reliant on 
notions of the sick body, omitting the understanding of endless desire, weigh on my own 
research question into the lived experience of addiction and recovery. While medical texts 
would not deny that the alcoholic desires alcohol, they are interested in explaining it as a 
function of the body. For my research question, I am interested in understanding how 
alcoholics make sense of this desire, how they recognize and understand their experiences. 
As demonstrated through my work with the Jellinek text, the body becomes a site for disease, 
and research into the understanding of the disease is singularly interested in the causation of 
the need for alcohol. Additionally, being ill requires a cure; “coming down with” addiction is 
a linear relation between ill health and necessary remedy. Addiction is characterized as a 
disfiguration of the body in need of correction. The notion of the lived experience and the 
self-understanding is overlooked by this model, despite its reliance on the very understanding 
of the notion of a need (for more). The phenomenon of addiction and recovery both needs 
further development of the understanding of endless desire, in light of this model, as well as 
appears like an endless desire that becomes overwhelming to manage.  
From Jellinek, the future of the disease concept moved into the popular medical realm 
of genetics. Recent texts search for genetic factors that explain and account for addiction in 
the family as a pattern and trait passed from one generation to the next. 
Family, adoption and twin studies have clearly demonstrated 
that genetic factors are important in moderating vulnerability to 
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alcoholism. Based on analyses of large, well-characterized 
cohorts of twins including nearly 10 000 twin pairs, alcoholism 
is a moderately to highly heritable psychiatric disease (Ducci & 
Goldman 2008:1415) 
As stated, addiction, alcoholism in this case, remains in the realm of the disease 
concept – the body’s need for alcohol. In the Ducci and Goldman text, it is caused by a silent 
structure, the genetic DNA chain. The search for genes is a modern version of the disease 
model from the 1960s; it turns the causation away from the species hypothesis, the virus 
analogy, to a predetermined cause of the illness, one put in place at the time of conception. 
Genes are the factors that determine the physical appearances of a person – everything from 
hair colour to bone structure. Expanding the influence a person’s genes has on their later 
actions, such as addiction, has vast implications for my investigation into the phenomenon of 
addiction. Can people’s actions be a consequence of the same force that causes a person’s 
physical appearance? 
The genetic concept, the theory that genes and DNA can cause particular 
predispositions in addition to particular physical traits, suggests a relation to 
predetermination and preordination. What does it mean to be fated to become an addict? 
Predetermined laws, such as the laws of genetics, and fate are silent forces that, no matter 
what human intervention is attempted, always lead to the predetermined outcome. To be 
genetically configured to have an addiction means that choice is not a viable or successful 
intervention. Addictions, as classified by the above illness concept, are negative 
characterizations, as disease is not healthy (positive). To be genetically marked as an addict 
means that a person is born with unhealthy genes, not normative, disfigured DNA. Because 
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DNA is dumb and invisible, people who are disfigured by the genetic mark of addiction may 
not even be aware of their predisposition to excessive drinking.  
People have little control over their natural traits such as hair colour or eye colour; a 
person cannot will their hair to change colour, but they can influence it by acting on it – hair 
dye, for example. For addiction, people would not be able to control their predisposition or 
disfigured DNA, but could they influence it with choice? Like changing the colour of one’s 
hair by decisive intervention, choosing to not become an addict could be possible. But here is 
an ambiguity located in this formulation of an addict. If one is fated to a certain end, choice is 
futile. And, like, hair dye, would an addict always be addicted? Just masking the addiction 
beneath the intervention of recovery? And if addiction could be changed, how is choice 
possible if predisposition naturally supersedes agency?  
This research offers a particular possibility to my research question about the lived 
experience of addiction and recovery. Relating to the experience of being enthralled to a 
master, the genetic heritability concept contributes to the self-understanding of the addict as 
someone who is controlled by an invisible and dumb force, the genetic code. But the traits of 
that force are recognizable and correctable, like seeing one’s own natural hair colour in the 
mirror, the addict can recognize that drinking is unhealthy; addiction can be changed by 
prosthetic intervention, as demonstrated through the analogy about hair dye, but the addict 
will always naturally be predisposed to drinking. The addict can see that drinking is causing a 
health problem, but is unable to intervene, leaving the addict feeling helpless against her own 
will to control her desire to drink – it is not her choice. As an essence, the feeling of 
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helplessness contributes to the self-understanding of the addict, she is one who wants to 
mediate in her own practices, but is unable to because she is at the will of another force. This 
self-understanding universally contributes to our understanding of the feeling of helplessness 
as if one is victim to conditions beyond control. 
Like the disease concept literature developed above, the dangers of the externalization 
of the body (genetics) from the mind (free will) poses a problem for the self-responsibility of 
the addict and her agency; it is overlooked by this characterization. Additionally, the 
assumptions that make the conceptualization of addiction as a disfiguration that curses and 
fates those marked with unhealthy DNA possible are not accountable to the lived experience 
of addiction. The essence of addiction is assumed in this kind of research. The genetic 
question moves away from the lived experience interpretation and understanding of addiction 
and recovery. By assuming the phenomenon, the whatness of the experience and how it is a 
possible one in the human condition, the feeling of helplessness as I describe here, the 
research relies on an understanding that isn’t fully described.  
Other research endeavours into the experience of addiction and recovery have also 
developed in relation to this biomedicalized characterization, the disease concept and genetic 
research. The phenomenon of addiction in the medical field is addressed in Medanik’s (2006) 
Biomedicalization of Alcohol Studies and is developed in relation to the consequences 
associated with the medicalized model of the disease and genetic concepts. 
Medicalizing social problems allows the deviant to assume the 
sick role and derive its benefits.  The deviant is not seen as the 
cause of his or her condition but rather an unfortunate, yet 
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legitimately sick individual who happens to have an illness but 
is not responsible for it. (Medanik 2006:23) 
This statement describes the addict as someone who is legitimately sick. Being sick is 
a biological infliction, where one is lacking in health. The legitimacy of illness is prescribed 
by experts in the medical profession; the naming and definitions of disease and symptoms are 
systematically in the realm of doctors, medical researchers, and the like. Being legitimately 
sick would be an instance of having those prescribed symptoms of an illness, where the body 
is not functioning in the medical definition of health, but is instead functioning at a reduced 
level that is medically evident and recognizable. These symptoms become self-aware to the 
ill person, as the patient learns to recognize the symptoms, and then orients to their existence 
in their actions.  Unlike someone who pretends to be sick, who knows the symptoms, but is 
exhibiting them by mimicry, the legitimately sick person both exhibits the medical 
symptoms, and they can be found to be evident. For example, the “faker” can pretend to have 
a sore throat by talking hoarsely and complaining of pain, but if there is no redness, swelling 
or presence of a medical problem, like the species of bacteria known as strep A, the sick 
person cannot be said to have a legitimate reason for having a sore throat. The medical 
profession validates a symptom; it can give the sick person credibility for her sick behaviour 
as well as an explanation for it. 
For the addict, this suggests that their behaviours are medically evident, that is that 
they are present and identifiable, and relevant to their prescription as an illness or lack of 
health. It also excuses the addict in a way that it explains her symptoms, out of control 
drinking, as being biologically caused; she is sick. The implications of this definition is that it 
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opens up the possibility for the addict to see the causes of her actions and her desires to 
pursue the pleasure of alcohol as external to her self-awareness and, subsequently, her 
responsibility. She can assume the role of the sick person because, not only is her behaviour 
legitimate, she is cast into the part. 
Two implications follow: the addict’s illness becomes incorporated into her self-
understanding; and the casting of the sick role requires the addict to get better and restore 
herself to good health (c.f. Parsons 1971). If the addict becomes aware of her drinking and 
desire for pleasure as symptoms of an illness, she comes to understand herself as a sick 
person: her desires for alcohol as a result of an affliction in her body. On the other hand, 
however, if she is beyond control of her illness, she has to find a way to become 
reempowered to overcome her desires for alcohol: she has to “get better”. An ambiguity 
starts to surface here as there is a simultaneous alleviation of responsibility and also a 
required repossession of it. A dilemma for action emerges as the sick role has imposing 
implications for both illness and health; admission of powerlessness over the symptoms of an 
illness as well as the need to repossess that self-same will power to stop or moderate the 
symptoms (drinking). While this typology of causation and disease as well as orienting 
towards the consequences of disabled responsibility, the above description has foundations 
on which it relies that are not accounted for. An inquiry into the consequences of the 
medicalized model of addiction assumes not only the essence of the addiction experience, but 
also the experience of coming down with an illness. 
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As I develop above, one essence of the experience of addiction offered by the 
Midanik text is the experience of being sick. For my inquiry into the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery, feeling and being sick offers further insight into the self-
understanding of the addict. Getting well is a necessary responsibility of the sick person; so, 
while the understanding of an illness is externalized to the body, the addict remains 
accountable to the commitment to restoring good health. The essence of being sick 
universally implies that having an illness has particular constraints; not only are the 
symptoms of illness a deviation from health, but refusing or failing to remedy the symptoms 
of illness is characterized as deviant as well. Socially, the imposition of illness is the 
compulsory expectation of recovery. 
3.3 Agency and Self-Understanding 
Thus far I have handled significant perspectives and texts regarding the disease 
concept of addiction and its implications for my research question, as well as exposing the 
gaps that lived experience research offers to fill. The above research has favoured the 
externalization of the struggle of the lived experience of addiction and recovery to the body’s 
function, or malfunctioning. Following, I will address research suggesting that the disease 
concept is a social construction. As I will demonstrate, while this move is closer to the 
orientation of an inquiry into the lived experience of addiction and recovery, I will show that 
it is still concerned with the causes and consequences of addiction rather than accounting for 
the assumptions of what makes it a possible human experience. 
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What are commonly termed the social problems of drinking 
can be viewed in this light as deviations from norms of 
individual behaviour which someone else has decided to 
“notice” rather than to overlook and which are seen as alcohol 
related. The concept of norms, then, directs our attention to the 
sociocultural factors, not only in drinking behaviour but also in 
the social problems of drinking. Too often, we forget that most 
drinking, including most heavy drinking, is social drinking in 
the sense that it is carried on with others and is heavily 
influenced by ‘their’ expectations. Too often, we think of 
social problems with drinking as opaque properties of the 
individual – “he has a job problem with his drinking” or “she 
has had problems with the police,” we will say – rather than as 
arising out of the interaction between the drinker’s behaviour 
and the various responses of others. Concepts like alcohol 
dependence or addiction direct our attention to the individual 
and the drug to the exclusion of elements of the social context 
... The concept of norms, then is simply a tool for focusing our 
attention on the details of sociocultural forces – the social 
incentives and constraints – which bear upon our individual 
drinking behaviours. (Room 1975:360) 
This description relates alcoholism and the addict to forces; drinking behaviours are 
consequences of the actor’s agency interacting with the force of cultural norms. While 
Room’s text rejects the medicalized understanding of addiction because of its externalized 
nature, that the body governs over the will of mind, it is still oriented to an understanding of 
addiction that is related to its encounter with external forces that he calls “norms”. Room 
calls this incentives and constraints. The notion of sociocultural forces in relation to incentive 
and constraint is a kind of orientation to the experience of addiction that is reminiscent of a 
stimulus-response in social contexts. The addict chooses to drink because drunkenness is 
pleasurable. The addict, in this textual expression, is a rational thinker, able to choose 




The reward of immediate pleasure for the addict is the incentive to drink alcohol; 
addicts drink for the pleasure that alcohol’s affects and drunkenness offers them. Constraints 
for addicts may be the undesirable sanctions of losing their job due to drunkenness at work, 
for example. Or, that they do not want to be drunk at an office Christmas party in case they 
do something they may later regret. As a rational thinker, the addict is able to assess the risk 
of each side, hypothesizing possible consequences. To drink, addicts face a dilemma to drink 
for pleasure if it could possibly lead to self-harm. The further the addict pursues pleasure, 
undesirable sanctions could arise. For my research question, this text offers the possibility of 
the phenomenon of facing dilemmas in the experience of addiction and recovery. 
Particularly, the case of addiction demonstrates that this phenomenon can be related to the 
desire for pleasure when known consequences can be potentially harmful.  
The orientation of Room’s text and research constructs the addict as someone who 
must think through the imposed conditions of the social world. An addict is someone who 
chooses pleasure over the possibility of constraining social forces. Addiction is the 
consequence of choosing the stimulus of pleasure from alcohol over the possible constraints 
of drunkenness. This kind of choice, however, is limited, as the addict is herself constrained 
by the assumptions implied by this formulation. Surely the struggle of addiction and the 
dilemma of drinking are greater than a simple choice between what is enjoyable and 
desirable and what is potentially harmful. In fact, the stimulus-response mechanism used to 
explain the social forces are limited by implications of an addict that is not reflecting; social 
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forces pose as simple choices driving the addict to make decisions that are without thought or 
self-awareness. 
The kind of agency suggested in the Room text is limited in comparison with lived 
experience research. My research project frames the addict as oriented towards a struggle 
with addiction and that this problem is part of the addict’s self-understanding. While this text 
brings my description of the lived experience closer to addiction through its interest in the 
social relation between the addict and her environment, its conception is too limited, painting 
the addict as facing bilinear choices, pleasure and undesirable consequences. 
The Big Book of Alcoholics Anonymous, however, offers a different perspective on 
the struggle for control over the relentless desires for drunkenness: 
That may be true of certain non-alcoholic people who, though 
drinking foolishly and heavily at the present time, are able to 
stop or moderate, because their brains and bodies have not 
been damaged as ours were. But the actual or potential 
alcoholic, with hardly an exception, will be absolutely unable 
to stop drinking on the basis of self-knowledge. (Alcoholics 
Anonymous :39; emphasis original) 
This describes particular people, addicts, who may not be able to control their 
drinking, while others can choose to drink moderately, enjoying alcohol, but avoiding 
drunkenness because it is not desired. This weakness in control suggests that the self-
knowledge of the alcoholic drinker is not strong enough to overcome the urges of the desire 
for the pleasure of drunkenness. However, considering this more generally, not only is the 
control and restraint of drinking practices necessary for the alcoholic drinker, over 
indulgence in pleasure is unrecognizable to them. Giving in to the desire to drink leads to 
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drunkenness despite attentions to moderate or control drinking activity. For the addict, self-
knowledge is powerless against the desires to overindulge to the point of intoxication. As 
opposed to a child, for example, who lacks self-knowledge and understanding – the child 
who eats candy until they are sick, who does not know he should stop – the addict has a self-
knowledge that they should stop drinking, but they are unable to stop, powerless against their 
own desires.  
With the above orientation to the problem of alcoholic drinking, the addict who 
desires restraint could be seen as someone who cannot self-reflect once engaging in drinking 
of any kind, that he is unable to make recognizable his own overindulgences, or to be 
ethically oriented to a self-understanding of what is good for him. The struggle for addicts is 
to recognize when to stop and follow through on that choice, not to let their desires for 
pleasure overwhelm them. At the intersection of this ethical dilemma and the deliberation to 
drink, the addict is encountering a problem with her desire for the pleasure of alcohol, but 
cannot recognize when she has over-indulged.  
Unlike the drinker who does not see a problem in self-indulgence, who goes out with 
the particular desire to get intoxicated, the addict goes out with the desire to abstain and to 
show restraint, but ends up intoxicated. For the addict, what becomes unrecognizable in 
practice (drinking) is the desire to show self-restraint from drunkenness (the self-knowledge 
that “I should stop”) once the experience of pleasure is present. Once the addict has 
succumbed to the desire to have one drink, she is unable to stop, and the result ends with her 
being drunk. It is not that the addict is incapable of seeing her own restrictions, that she 
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knows she should not drink, but that she struggles to show self-restraint as she pursues her 
desire for pleasure. Unlike someone who seeks pleasure and eschews self-restraint, like a 
daredevil who seeks the thrill of being at risk, who does not hesitate to act in dangerous 
situations, the addict’s self-knowledge of her own limitations, that she should not drink 
dangerously or overindulge, is different: she does desire to moderate or abstain from 
drinking, she knows that it leads to self-harm; whereas, the daredevil does not care if the 
situation at hand would lead to self-harm. For the addict, the powerlessness of being 
overwhelmed by the desire for the pleasure of drunkenness, leads to the pursuit of deeper 
indulgence. 
The problem of self-knowledge and making recognizable over-indulgence is not one 
of ignorance nor is it one of recklessness. Instead, it is the experience of getting carried away. 
Getting carried away is redeemed by the choice to pursue action that it is enjoyable, and that 
it also has a metaphoric quality of that agency being taken away or becoming secondary to 
the enjoyment. For addiction, drinking is started on the basis of the desire for pleasure, and in 
continuing to enjoy the pleasure of drinking, the thoughtful reflection of choice, 
responsibility and self-moderation becomes superseded by the pursuit of pleasure. In this 
way, self-knowledge becomes governed by the initial choice for pleasure, rather than a 
continued engagement of reflection and further drinking or ceasing to drink. Pleasure allows 
for the experience of getting carried away as an enjoyable one, and the need for self-
reflection becomes unnecessary.  
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While language in this text is similar to that which was seen in the disease and the 
body section, particularly in reference to the damaged body as a cause of addiction, the text 
maintains an orientation to agency through its use of the self-knowledge concept. However, it 
is the text’s unthought relation between self-knowledge and the body that has not been 
accounted for by its author. This relationship, as I have tried to develop in relation to the 
phenomenon of addiction, is relied on, but not explored and developed. In this way, lived 
experience research is particularly concerned with how this relationship between self-
understanding and the body contributes to the possible essences in the experience of 
addiction and recovery, while methodically being accountable to that relationship in its 
discovery and analysis.  
3.4 Relapse and Desire  
For the development of my research question, the experience of addiction and 
recovery, texts about addiction have implications for recovery as well as vice versa. 
Following, I am developing some texts that have dealt more explicitly with the phenomenon 
of recovery, but are of particular importance to my inquiry into addiction as well. As seen in 
the previous sections, addiction literature often invokes definitions of unnormativity and an 
implied prescription for correction and remedy. As I will develop in this section and the 
following section, treatment, the phenomenon of recovery relies on particular assumptions 
about addiction.  
This craving for alcohol that occurs later in recovery likely is 
caused by a long-term recollection of “what it was like to 
drink.” Situations in which alcohol previously was experienced 
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as pleasurable or in which alcohol previously served to relieve 
stress may activate this memory. The conditioning models of 
craving and relapse attempt to explain these situations in the 
terms of classical stimulus-response relationships. According 
to those models, environmental events or changes in internal 
emotional states trigger a series of neurochemical reactions that 
through past experience have been programmed to activate 
various brain systems, thereby leading to the experience of 
craving. (Anton 1999:168) 
Craving in this text is developed as a bodily force that overwhelms the addict’s will 
power. Whilst seeking pleasure, the addiction is characterized as a cognitive-body reaction. 
In this way, addicts are victims of a dumb force, like Pavlov’s dog unable to control his 
salivation, so too are alcoholics unable to resist the craving for drunkenness in this particular 
way. Closer to my research question, however, this research opens up the possibility that the 
pleasure of alcohol is a wonderful experience for the addict, and that the memory of its 
pleasure has the potential to overwhelm the addict and lead to reengaging the desire to drink. 
The pleasurable memory rests on the foundations of a sensitive awareness that becomes 
present to self-knowledge through the body. 
Reviving this phenomenological perspective – the mind/body relation – of memory 
can help develop a stronger reading of the above explanation of craving, the memory of 
pleasure leading to desire. “The body expresses total existence, not because it is an external 
accompaniment to that existence, but because existence comes into its own in the body” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962:166). In this orientation, the body is not an external force acting on the 
mind, instead, the mind and one’s being in the world is possible through the presence of the 
body’s existence. The body and mind are intertwined in their existence, each needing the 
other in its presence. Memory, then, is a recollection of sensational acuity, and the mind’s 
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self-knowledge of pleasure comes into its existence through the body. The recalling of that 
pleasurable memory can create a longing to again experience that sensation. 
With this orientation to the problem posed here in the literature, there is an 
intertwined relation between the location – the body’s being in the world – at a bar, for 
example, or being together with friends, and self-reflection that reminds the addict of a 
memory of past pleasurable experiences. Encountering and reflecting on memories of 
pleasure happens simultaneously in a dialectical relation between the bodily, the biological 
being, and self-reflection and recognition of those past instances of pleasure. A struggle 
emerges as the addict remembers the pleasure of drinking by reflecting on its affects on the 
body. The addict is courted by her own reflections, overcoming her hesitations and 
reservations to abstain or restrain. The addict’s awareness and self-indication of the 
recollected sensation and remembrance of the pleasure from alcohol is an overwhelming 
memory.  
The feeling of lust encounters the addict in relation to remembered sensations of 
pleasure. The addict desires to have that experience again, relive it. Addiction is universally 
related to the feeling of lust, an overpowering desire for sensations of pleasure felt in the 
body. Through this essence that is shaped by a situated location of memory and its relation to 
time and space and the body, recovery is an experience that must deal with forming new 
relationships with those situations. The notion of recollection implies that addiction is related 
to the situated body and to pleasure; recovery and its encounter with those highly 
sensationalized experiences can be influenced by a lustful return to those sensory memories. 
 
 66 
While the literature implies that addicts should avoid situations that could lead to lust, the 
addict who is aware of her lust can develop a new relation to those spaces in light of her 
restraint from over indulgence. 
For my research question, the lived experience of addiction and recovery is the 
struggle with the problem of lust and the senses. Rather than examining the situational 
memory as an externalized force acting on the addict and causing her to relapse and drink to 
excess – a “trigger” in the brain – the lived experience is interested in how the essence of lust 
makes the experience of addiction and recovery a possible human experience.  
Other research into relapse focuses on the cycle of addiction and recovery as a 
process. 
The control phase inevitably breaks down, whether it is for 1 
hour, 1 week, 1 month, or 1 year, and the addict is back in the 
behavior again despite his or her promise to himself or herself 
or others never to do it again. When the ecstasy of the release is 
spent, the addict will often feel remorse at his or her failure 
and, with great resolve, will switch back to another “white 
knuckle” period of abstaining from the behaviour. (Young 
2008:28) 
In the above description of relapse, recovery is referred to as a series of phases. 
Young calls relapse the breakdown of the control phase. She characterizes this breakdown as 
a broken promise. A promise is a commitment made to oneself or to others that dedicates a 
person to practicing, in this case, abstinence. A promise is a wilful devotion, not adjudged 
onto someone, but is a free choice to ongoingly preserve that commitment. Recovery, in this 
sense, is a promise to abstain; the addict freely dedicates herself to stopping the behaviour, 
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drinking. This implies that addiction is also a choice, and with the right amount of 
commitment to ceasing, recovery is possible. 
Further, Young describes the promise of abstinence as a “white knuckled” 
commitment. The notion of white knuckling, a kind of will, or determination, in relation to 
the lived experience of alcohol consumption is a steadfast abstinence from drinking. The 
practice of, or omission from practicing drinking, white knuckle quitting is holding onto that 
abstinence and refusing to let go of that will power to refuse to drink. If this practice is 
particular to the experience of recovery, it suggests that the desire to not drink can overcome 
the need for pleasure that addicts seek. If the phenomenon of white knuckling is considered 
as a necessary self-understanding for addicts restraining themselves from drinking, this 
commitment demonstrates a member actively engaging his will to control his desires to drink 
for pleasure by abstaining. Giving in to the pleasure of drinking, is giving over to an 
uncontrolled desire to drink. Drinking socially, the practice of indulgence in the pleasure of 
alcohol without drinking to intoxication, is not possible if the addict is upholding this 
promise to abstain. Restraint from the pleasure of drinking is a kind of “all or nothing” 
relation; white knuckling is the only way to avoid overindulgence and intoxication. For the 
addict, it seems, the pleasure of alcohol must be necessarily controlled through the restraint 
or abstinence from drinking. 
White knuckling relies on the assumption that the promise of recovery is made under 
duress. To further consider this phenomenon, Edwards (2000) offers insight into the self-
understanding of dependency. He states that, when someone purchases 
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...alcohol, an individual’s control over choice can become 
impaired by dependency. When such a person slips yet another 
bottle of gin into the supermarket trolley, the purchase will 
have been made under an inner duress of a kind not 
experienced with any other item in the shop, save nicotine. 
Dependence is duress. (Edwards 2000:72) 
Duress is here described in relation to addiction. To feel under duress is to feel 
threatened or forced to do something. Addiction in this case is characterized as a desire that 
imposes a sense of urgency and coercion on an addict. Addicts feel they must drink, that they 
must buy the alcohol to carry on. To make the promise to recover requires a certain kind of 
courage, standing up against the desires that threaten and keep the addict at bay. Addiction, 
then, is an experience than can be willfully overcome with a promise, but making that 
promise is made in the shadows of a sense of duress, and that absolute restraint and 
steadfastness to that promise is necessary to succeed. White knuckling is a necessity for the 
addict to uphold her vow to a life of abstinence because further drinking enters the addict into 
that same threatened relationship of coercion, that she must continue to drink. The promise of 
recovery is made under difficult circumstances. Relapse, breaking the promise, denotes the 
struggle between the duress of desire and the dedication to recovery. 
For lived experience research, the phenomena of addiction and recovery as an 
essential experience made under duress would seek to illustrate the struggle as a universal of 
the human condition. Keeping alive the concept of desire, the experience of recovery as it 
relates to the experience of addiction would lead the inquiry in the direction of the self-
understanding of the addict in the midst of a struggle. While the above research has 
contributed to the lived experience understanding of addiction and recovery as an experience 
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of duress, there remains a gap in describing what that experience and struggle is. In this way, 
my thesis addresses this experience by using my research materials (chapter four) to develop 
lived experience descriptions as well as perform an analysis (chapter five). 
3.5 Treatment 
In addition to the topics I have covered throughout my review of the literature in my 
inquiry into the lived experience of addiction and recovery, I will lastly address a trend in the 
literature that assesses the need for treatment. The concept of treatment has implications for 
my research question, as it relies on the assumption of a problem, addiction, and a method for 
cure, recovery. Below I will develop two texts in relation to my research problem. 
One research interest in studies on treatment of addiction, is the therapeutic 
community. Kaplan and Broekaert (2003) explain that this 
concept was based on the more conventional goal of 
psychiatric treatment and rehabilitation, the social inclusion 
and integration into society of the recovered addict. The TC 
[therapeutic community] recovered ‘graduates’ could act as 
role models for a drug-free lifestyle and therefore exert the 
social impact of the TC on the wider society. They also could 
instil the hope in society that although addiction may be 
characterised at best as a chronically relapsing disease, 
recovery was possible and the fearsome experience of 
addiction could be transformed into something that eventually 
strengthens the fabric of a democratic society. The TC, when 
managed with an eye to protect against the dangers of cultism 
and the substitution of an authoritarian personality for an 
addiction disorder, enabled individuals to develop a set of 
personal and social skills that empowered them for a steady 
path of autonomous and continual change in themselves and in 
the larger society (Kaplan & Broekaert 2003:205) 
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Kaplan emphasizes the importance of community for recovering addicts. By this 
orientation to recovery, it is suggested that addicts wanting to recover must first feel as if 
they “belong” to the sober community. The community is structured towards “leading by 
example” principles and instructing addicts how to lead a “normal”, sober life with everyday 
social skills. This assumes that addicts belong to a community that does not have these 
“skills”. In this text, the addict community that fails to have “normative” skill and has 
differing practices, is segregated from the sober/nonaddict community. The text points to a 
need to integrate addicts and nonaddicts so that the addict might conform to the “normative” 
nonaddict practices. 
This orientation of integration implies that addiction is both not normal and also 
fundamentally different at the level of community. Restoration and assimilation to normal is 
treated as a requirement for recovery. The therapeutic community takes on the role of a 
training experience, demonstrating normative practices – without becoming deviant and 
“cult-like” – to addicts in hopes that they will be successful in learning the acceptable kinds 
of social skills. This community has implications for addiction, that it is a deviance from the 
normative ways of living; and thus recovery is a transformation away from the addict’s 
reversion into deviance, and restores the new, normative, social person into the wider society. 
To treat the experience of addiction and recovery as a problem for integration of 
deviants back in the wider society, ignores the assumptions that are made by orienting to the 
phenomenon of addiction and recovery in this way. The research masks its construction of 
addiction as deviance and its prescription for integration by language that is, at the surface, 
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seemingly holistic. The deeper essence of addiction is ignored by its implicit assertions about 
normativity and deviance in relation to the community. Lived experience research would be 
instead interested in the phenomena of addiction and recovery as it existentially relates to 
shared space and the relationship with the community. This text has the potential to 
contribute to the self-understanding of the addict as it relates to her spatiality and relationality 
in the lifeworld. However, this text is not oriented to the phenomenon in the way that lived 
experience research would be, and is instead condemning and prescriptive toward the addict. 
Aside from research that examines treatment as a process of integration to the 
normative practices of the community, some research questions the validity and necessity of 
treatment at all. Prins’ (2008) article examines the phenomenon of recovery by mapping out 
the biography of addicts and demonstrates that recovery is an inevitability related to maturity. 
I hope to have shown important features of the trajectories of 
hard-drug addicts and of their maturing out. A distinguishing 
feature is, for example, the fact that such trajectories are 
"follow-up" or secondary trajectories. In order to understand 
their course one has to take into account the prior experiences 
of suffering and turmoil. Something which I focused on in my 
discussion of the process of maturing out is the necessity of 
doing biographical work—work which can be encouraged by 
professionals but which might also be performed totally 
independently from them. Some of it may also be marked by a 
critical distance from professionals and institutional services. 
(Prins 2008) 
As I illustrated in previous sections, the formulation of addiction as a sickness or 
social problem implies that it must be corrected or resolved. Treatment programs created 
around this assumption claim to restore the addict to good health and normality through 
various methods ranging across a wide spectrum. Prins’ research suggests that it is possible 
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that treatment is not necessary, and that the life course of the addict and her personal choices 
may be all that is necessary, rather than a medical intervention. The notion of biographical 
work illuminates an addict’s relation to self-reflection, that medical practices and “cures” 
may not be the central turning point in an addict’s recovery.  
The implications of this research conclusion demonstrates a need to further 
understand the addict’s self-knowledge and reflective relation to her own lived experience of  
addiction and recovery. If the maturity of the addict is particular to her commitment to 
recovery, it suggests that addiction is not as an impossible overpowering force, but is a 
relation to a substance that has self-possessing qualities for the addict. Addicts experiencing 
recovery are engaged in their own life choices and experiences, and are culpable to them. 
Working through materials that are particularly and universally concerned with the essence 
of the experience of addiction and its recovery would be able to expose the addict’s self-
understanding of this journey, focusing less on the success rates of medical intervention and 
more on the intervention of the addict’s self-knowledge that moves her to dedicate herself to 
recovery. 
Additional to the texts that I have worked through and developed in this chapter, I 
would like to summarize a few concluding remarks that collect my work with the texts and 
what they offer for my current inquiry, as well as reiterate the necessity for the kind of 
analysis I am doing in my research. While the word addict has transformed drastically since 
its first occurrence in language, most speech has come to use this term as a reference to 
 
 73 
dependency. But, as I have demonstrated, this dependency develops through an encounter 
with a desire for pleasure. 
Dependency, as it appears in medical research, is a concept that moves away from the 
addict’s self-understanding and agency. Research thus far constructs the addict as 
biologically malfunctioning, genetically disfigured, a victim of both a kind of “viral 
affliction” and fate. These formulations result in the addict’s social obligation to “get well 
soon” as well as integrate back into the normative community. For addiction research, the 
medicalized model offers a focus on the body that assumes the addict’s self-awareness. 
Medicalization offers great advances into the understanding of the biological function of the 
addict, but it takes for granted the self-reflective work that addicts do in relation to their 
illness or addiction. For example, as discussed above, the medical model explains the desire 
of the addict as a physical urge or biological function. Like hunger, addicts are able to 
identify, reflect on, and understand their urges. In the medical model, the addict’s urges can 
be “cured” and corrected with proper treatment. These implications, that the addict’s desire is 
recognized as a physical urge, and that the urges are in need of correction rely on the fact that 
addicts have the self-awareness to reflect on their physical bodies and their desires to make 
sense of the addiction. As discussed, the responsibility of the sick role is to self-correct, to 
get well. To say this is to recognize and make sense of the physical urge and the body. The 
medical model does not uncover the reflection that addicts do to recognize the illness. My 
research will contribute to this field by developing the self-reflection and awareness of the 
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addict – it will show the sense-making that is relied on to understand addiction – what makes 
it possible for addicts to recognize their urges. 
Lived experience research focuses on this desire and self-understanding of the body, 
how addiction becomes a recognizable object of the body. Lived experience research allows 
for the focus on self-understanding by engaging the materials reflexively. Reflexivity 
reconnects the object of study (the medicalized body) to the assumptions being relied on 
(desire as a physical urge). The reflexive reconnection is a better way to develop the 
assumptions and deeper meaning of the phenomenon of addiction, as I demonstrate 
throughout the project. Reflexivity makes explicit the meaning making and interpretive 
processes that both the addict and other research approaches rely on but do not make explicit. 
For this reason, lived experience research is necessary for alcohol and addiction studies; I 
reconnect the medical model’s assumptions to the deeper meaning and self-understanding of 
the addict.  
Further, the medical model is also embraced by the AA member to understand 
addiction and recovery. As described above in the Big Book, understanding addiction and 
alcoholism as a disease is a way to help make sense of it as a physical urge that requires 
treatment and correction. For the AA member, too, there underlies particular interpretive 
work that assumes an understanding of the body, what it means to be sick, and how 
biological urges determine behaviour. My thesis shows this interpretive work by making it 
recognizable, by describing it, and analyzing it. The orientation of lived experience research 
keeps the agency of the addict alive as well as explicitly shows the interpretive work that 
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addicts do to understand their experiences as possible ones. My research reconnects these 
above implications of the current research to the self-understanding of the addict through the 
method of lived experience research and my research inquiry into the essence of addiction 
and recovery. 
I will now proceed to chapter four, Materials, where I will further develop my 
research question by using the interview data collected from alcoholic anonymous members. 
While this chapter of literature review has been both a demonstration of the treatment of text 
as materials that bring the inquirer closer to the essence of the phenomenon, I have also taken 
this opportunity to show why my research is necessary in the field of addiction studies. 
Because the texts that I have worked with here were not interested in describing the lived 
experience of the addict, nor were they oriented to their materials in the hermeneutic 
phenomenological tradition, in the next chapter I will be introducing my interview materials. 
These additional materials will be put into play with what I have here to develop themes and 






In this chapter I will develop the interview materials with the Alcoholics Anonymous 
members about their struggle with alcohol in order to examine the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery. In this section, I will treat the interview narratives as anecdotal 
expressions that can be thematically organized to reveal something universal about the 
essence of addiction and recovery. Prior to this work with the texts, I will first develop a 
detailed argument for the pedagogical use of the “theme” in hermeneutic phenomenological 
research as distinct from the symbolic interactionist method, as well as a better way to bring 
out the lived experience and essence of the human experience of addiction and recovery. 
Staying close with the Van Manen (2006) text, the use of a theme will be illustrated as a 
good tool for uncovering, discovering, and revealing the meaning of the experience under 
inquiry. First by providing an account and justification for the use of the theme in the 
hermeneutic phenomenological method, I will make use of symbolic interaction literature as 
an interlocutor that will distinguish thematic lived experience research from the concept 
driven symbolic interaction method, as well as illuminate the orientedness of the theme to 
meaning in a way that the concept does not. Then, I will develop my materials as an example 
of the reflexive use of the theme, and concluding with a lived experience description of the 
phenomenon of addiction and recovery. 
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4.1 What is a theme? 
Van Manen describes the use and significance of the theme in a variety of ways. The 
use of a theme helps to illuminate the meaning, focus and point of the speech (text) (Van 
Manen 2006:87). The theme is the first intersection that the interpreter has with the 
significance of the essence of the experience under inquiry. It is the “deepened and reflexive 
understanding” of the experience that is telling of the essence, is points to something 
meaningful about the phenomenon (Van Manen 2006:86). In my inquiry into the lived 
experience of addiction and recovery, the theme of lostness, for example, points at a possible 
essence that makes addiction a significant experience in the human condition. 
The theme, however, is not the depth of the inquiry and its analysis, it instead 
simplifies the essence and falls short of its deeper meaning (Van Manen 2006:87). As 
outlined in chapter two, theory and method, language is merely a construction; a theme is a 
linguistic reference that is constructed based on various pre-understandings. The theme 
acknowledges this limitation, as it is merely a tool to open up the following analysis of the 
material to develop the phenomenon in more particular ways. Themes point to possible 
universal experiences, albeit a simplified version of them. Using the example of lostness, the 
word lostness does not encompass the experience of lostness in the particular lived 
experience of addiction. Using lostness as a theme, however, does start to open up the 
possibility of further depth to the phenomenon of addiction. Lostness is both a universal 
possibility, that someone could experience lostness in a strange city, for example, and it is 
also a way to further think about the particular experience of addiction and recovery. The 
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word lostness does not encompass the overall meaning of addiction, but it is a way into 
developing the deeper meaning of this lived experience. 
Further, a theme is intransitive (Van Manen 2006:87). This assumption does not mean 
that the theme is an abstraction from the text; it is not an object in the text already, but it is 
interpreted from the text. This requires reflexive work of the inquirer. The text will not state 
that lostness is how addicts feel prior to recovery, but it will instead have qualities that are 
both reminiscent of feeling lost and that can be further understood if illuminated by the 
notion of lostness. How does lostness help us understand the text? How does the text help us 
understand lostness? The interpretive work requires a kind of creativity and thinking that 
examines what experience is being relied on, is pre-thought, in the description of the 
experience. 
The theme then leads to a formulation of the text. The theme gives the phenomenon a 
structure and a form (Van Manen 2006:87). By giving it structure, it does not mean that the 
lived experience is generalizable or predictable, but, rather, that it is an essence that 
universally relates to the human condition. Further, the universal relation gives the particular 
phenomenon a way of understanding and interpreting its importance. For example, 
understanding addiction as the feeling of lostness shapes the experience of the phenomenon 
as one among many in universal understanding of lostness. Not only could lostness be a 
feeling experienced in other situations, as mentioned before, lostness provides a way to think 
about addiction, with certain implications for its form. What does the addicted experience 
look like if it is the feeling of being lost? In describing this essence of lostness, it gives 
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meaning and form to the phenomenon of addiction, providing both insight and shape to a 
word and experience that is open to a number of subjective understandings.  
4.2 How to develop a theme 
In order for the inquirer to formulate and develop the themes in her materials, it 
requires a particular orientation to the phenomenon: the desire to make sense; an openness to 
the possibilities; and invention, discovery, and disclosure (Van Manen 2006:88). The desire 
to make sense implies that the inquirer treats the phenomenon as a “mystery”, as something 
“puzzling” or “odd”. By making the phenomenon unfamiliar this allows for the inquirer to 
orient herself to the text in a way that desires to make it something familiar and palpable. 
Further, treating the experience as a mystery demonstrates that the essence uncovered is 
merely one possibility, that it cannot fully be known; the essence is only known in relation to 
the interpretation of its meaning. The essence can be described by showing the interpretive 
work being relied on within the text. The mystery of the phenomenon means that it is 
knowable, but only through interpretation, and never as a fixed, prescriptive, or definite 
certainty. For my materials about addiction, I will treat addiction as an unfamiliar experience. 
This orientation may pedagogically allow me to leave possible assumptions behind, insofar 
as I am searching for what makes addiction what it is: how is it a possible experience? What 
is the essence of that experience? 
Treating the phenomenon as mysterious does not mean mystification; it is not an 
approach that assumes a particular moral implication. By treating the phenomenon under 
question as unfamiliar allows the inquirer to be open to any possibility. The phenomenon is 
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transformed by the theme, and the researcher must be open to seeing the phenomenon in a 
way that is new. For addiction, the feeling of lostness is not necessarily a way that addiction 
is described everyday, but it is a theme that emerges through the way that people talk about 
their experiences with addiction. In order to arrive at this creative form of addiction, I have to 
be open to thinking about addiction as an experience that is more than the biological body or 
disease. These assumptions do not allow for an examination of the lived experience, as I 
demonstrated in chapter three, and they strive to make the phenomenon definite. Lostness, as 
a form, is an essential experience that is both unique and universal to my phenomenon. 
Developing the lived experience of lostness in relation to the phenomenon of addiction 
would not have been possible if I was not open to seeing addiction in a new way and if I 
assumed that addiction was a definable disease. The theme is a tool that renders a kind of 
openness to the approach of the phenomenon. 
For the theme to emerge, invention, discovery, and disclosure are present throughout 
the development of the phenomenon. The aspect of invention points to the researcher’s 
interpretation of the phenomenon (Van Manen 2006:88). This acknowledges the creativity of 
the inquirer who desires to make sense of the mystery and is open to the possibilities that the 
research question makes available for the interpretation of the materials. As well, the notion 
of invention admits the hermeneutic exchange between the inquirer’s history and location as 
the textual expression encounters her. As mentioned before, the inquirer interprets the text, 
and it is one interpretation possible among many. The research enters into a metaphorical 
dialogue with the life of the text – what does the text offer to the experiential interpretation of 
 
 81 
life (the particular text and the universal possibilities)? The hermeneutic method of 
interpretation assumes that the text has voice that encounters the inquirer. The discovery of 
the theme is a result of that dialectical interpretation of the text. How does the theme shape 
the text? What does the text illuminate about the nature of the theme? In other words, 
lostness both shapes the interpretation of the text, leading to discoveries about the 
phenomenon of addiction that may have not yet be thought of; and, the experience of 
addiction points to one possible essence and nature of the experience of lostness. It is in this 
way that the theme allows for the text to disclose something to the inquirer. The theme gives 
the text something that was not present at the surface; it is granted as part of a deeper reading 
of the text.  
4.3 What does a theme do? 
The theme has an instrumental quality; it is a tool to get at the notion or essence of the 
text (Van Manen 2006:88). The theme is not the final result of an inquiry; it is the tool that 
moves the inquiry forward. Van Manen calls the theme a techne, also called a craft. This 
implies that the theme is part of a practice that moves the interpretation toward an appearance 
(the desired essence of the experience and phenomenon under question). The appearance is 
the notion of a whole, that the phenomenon is a particular experience, but also part of a 
universally understood human experience. To say universally understood draws on the 
principle foundation of the ontology of phenomenology; that is, what is universally 
understood is the way that objects are there. The task of the theme is to describe how people 
relate to the object, and show that they understand how to relate to it. The theme as a tool is 
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only one part of the whole, as something that allows the whole to be shaped and crafted, 
brought to life in the parts of text and larger than the texts from which it emerges. The notion 
of lostness brings the experience of addiction to a meaning that is greater than the parts of the 
text, but also connects that experience to a larger and deeper understanding. The theme, both 
created by and guiding the inquirer, allows for the phenomenon to take shape, connecting it 
to the universal feeling of lostness, and to transform the words of the particular text to have a 
relationship to the whole of the essential, universal quality that the experience of addiction 
makes possible. 
As a tool, the theme also enables the description of an ineffable essence – giving 
“shape to the shapeless” (Van Manen 2006:88). Because lived experience research strives to 
get at the pre-understanding and unawareness of experience, describing an essence that is 
unthought is not a task that renders concrete formulations. The essence is itself a shapeless 
and indescribable whatness that makes the experience what it is and what it is not through a 
way of experiencing a phenomenon that is relied on but not conscious. That is, the essence is 
not concrete, our relation to something and our interpretive work is not a thing, but a 
happening. The theme provides a way to give form to that whatness; it gives one possible 
shape for a particular experience, fixing it to both the content as well as the universal. 
The essence is grounded in the text but also greater than the text. The theme describes 
the content of the text (Van Manen 2006:88). In addition to being a universal quality, the 
theme is grounded in the particular words of the text; the theme emerges through working 
with the text. The theme of lostness can describe the text that offered that theme as a possible 
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formulation. And, the theme can also connect the text to the larger, universal understanding 
of what it means to be lost.  
Finally, the theme is a “reduction of a notion”; it lights a small part of a deeper 
meaning of the mystery and essence of the lived experience under inquiry (Van Manen 
2006:88). The theme does not capture the entire realm of possible essences that make up the 
experience of the phenomenon, but it does develop the research in a way that sheds light on 
part of the human experience. The theme is not all encompassing or in any way verifiable or 
generalizable. The deeper meaning that emerges through the theme is only a small part of the 
complex nature of the phenomenon. The interpretation of the inquirer is only one insight into 
the deeper meaning of the experience, not an overarching theme that could characterize all 
experiences of the particular phenomenon. While the theme does describe the text, the theme 
is merely a reduction that grasps at one particular meaning that illuminates the possibility of 
a universal essence; it is not definitive. The theme of lostness is not an understanding that is 
overarchingly descriptive of all addiction experiences. Lostness merely represents an object, 
an experience, of one essence that makes the description within the text possible, one 
possible lived experience, and emerges from the text. Lostness is also a way to see a deeper 
meaning associated with the phenomenon of addiction; the mystery, the essence, is shown to 
me, the researcher, through my interpretation and work with the text as well as through my 
dialectical engagement with the text (particular) and the theme (universal). 
To make the distinction between the universal notion of a theme and a generalizable 
concept, I will now use symbolic interaction to demonstrate how the concept does not get at 
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the meaning of a phenomenon in the same way that a theme does, all the while making it 
clear the difference between the two terms and approaches.  
4.4 How is a theme different than a concept? 
Symbolic interaction uses a similar method of data collection for their sociological 
analysis, the interview. However, what they do with the material, construct concepts, is far 
different than the hermeneutic phenomenological method that I am using in this lived 
experience research project. The concept, for symbolic interactionists, is a generalizable term 
that claims to represent the process by which something happens in relation to subjective 
meaning. I will demonstrate that the emphasis of the concept, however, does not get at the 
lived experience, despite its claim to do so and the method of data collection and 
interpretation. 
While the method of data collection for symbolic interaction, interviews and 
participant observation, is meant to get at the actual, lived, everyday experiences of the 
members and participants in particular activities and groups, the treatment of the data is 
where the meaning becomes lost. Additionally, while the method of analyzing the text, 
description, sounds similar to hermeneutic phenomenology, it is, in fact, very different. 
Symbolic interaction focuses on how meaning is negotiated, not what something means. This 
may seem like a subtle difference, but it is, instead, this emphasis on the process of meaning 
negotiation ignores the meaning of the phenomenon under question; symbolic interaction 
research assumes the whatness, the essence of the phenomenon. The formulation and 
description of concepts, in relation to the meaning negotiated process, is not interested in the 
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particular and the universal, but instead interested in the generalizable. I will further 
elaborate by discussing the following prominent symbolic interaction scholars, Blumer 
(1969), Goffman (1974), Glaser and Strauss (1967), and Prus (1996). 
Herbert Blumer describes symbolic interaction research as the need to produce 
sensitizing concepts: “Sensitizing concepts...gives the user a general sense of reference and 
guidance in approaching empirical instances” (Blumer 1969:148). The user in this case is 
both the researcher and the reader. The concept gives to the researcher a frame of reference 
for understanding the empirical instances in relation to the general. The concept is a way of 
suggesting, of making meaning available for comparing and contrasting other instances of 
the same context. While this may sound similar to the theme, the concept is not oriented by a 
desire to develop the meaning of a phenomenon; its referential relation to the generalizable 
deemphasizes the essence of the phenomenon.  
Blumer goes on to say that “sensitizing concepts can be tested, improved and refined. 
Their validity can be assayed through careful study of empirical instances which they are 
presumed to cover” (Blumer 1969:150). Essentially, Blumer’s argument for the creation of 
sensitizing concepts is one that calls for a general theory that explains all instances of 
behaviour. Blumer prescribes that creating such concepts are possible if they are 
continuously tested against instances from different situational contexts, and then current 
concepts are modified and changed to explain the new as well as the old instances. 
A few implications follow from Blumer’s proposed research strategy. Blumer’s 
postulation to continuously change the concept never fully uncovers or develops the 
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concept’s meaning, essence, and whatness. The concern with applicability keeps the focus of 
the concept on the empirical world; that the concept must accurately explain something is 
very different than having a concept that describes that thing. The theme, which is a 
description of the content, emphasizes the phenomenon’s relation to the universal without the 
need for testing. The concept, however, is related to the universal insofar as it must be viable 
for explaining all kinds of social action. The theme is different from the concept because of 
its desire for understanding the phenomenon under question. Phenomenological research 
takes the case and materials under question as an occasion to develop a deeper relation to an 
experience in light of both what that experience is, and how it is possible in the human 
condition. Symbolic interaction research sees its data as only possible instances that are parts 
of a sum; the concepts should explain both the parts (the data) as well as the sum of all 
human actions. Symbolic interaction’s concern with testing removes the need for deep 
understanding, and instead is only interested in the concept’s generalizability, its ability to 
explain every possible instance. 
Erving Goffman’s research has also been grouped in the symbolic interaction 
literature. His research called for the development of “Schematics of interpretation...which 
enables people to locate, perceive, identify and label ‘occurrences of information’” (Goffman 
1974:515). For Goffman, the schematics are procedures related to interpretation that enable 
the naming of action. Naming, a process that characterizes and categorizes, implies that all 
action will be grouped in to various types of action, or what Goffman calls occurrences of 
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information. Not only is interpretation formatted to a procedural relation, but action is 
viewed in this procedure as part of a number of subset groups of kinds of action. 
To organize the instances of action, called information, into groups, removes the 
emphasis on interpretation in the hermeneutic sense. First, consider that action becomes an 
occurrence of information. Phenomenological research states that all kinds of action have an 
essence, a meaning, a whatness. To think about that whatness, the ineffable quality of action 
that makes it humanly possible, instead as information suggests that has a notifying quality; 
information reports and purports to be concretely ground in actuality. Schematics, then, is a 
procedure that groups empirical instances into kinds of action, categorizes them, and conveys 
information to the reader about the phenomenon. This is different than the theme because the 
theme is not interested in categorizations as the end through which information is conveyed 
about the phenomenon, as the concept does, but instead treats the phenomenon as one 
possible particular manifestation in action of a universal human experience. The text under 
hermeneutic scrutiny is not relaying information about the phenomenon, it is an experience 
that reveals itself in that particular instance. The theme gets at what is not said in the 
instances of the text, what makes that text possible, that experience a possible one. The 
concept in the form of a schematic works at merely making the experience a categorical one, 
and that naming reveals information about the actuality of that kind of experience. Goffman’s 
proposed scheme of interpretation that is conceptually oriented does not interpret the text at 
all; instead, it names that text under the assumption of what the text means without doing the 
work to develop the essential qualities of the text. 
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Further, Barney Glaser and Anslem Strauss were also concerned with the creation of 
many concepts to form larger theory. 
Theory...must fit the situation being researched, and work 
when put into use. By 'fit' we mean that the categories must be 
readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data 
under study; by 'work' we mean that they must be meaningfully 
relevant to and be able to explain the behavior under study. 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967:3) 
These symbolic interaction – also called “grounded theory” – researchers are 
concerned not with the whatness of the phenomenon, but with the applicability of the 
research results. Further, their proposed notion of a theoretical understanding of a 
phenomenon is simply its ability to explain it, and that same concept could explain other 
kinds of behaviour as well. The concern with relevance, how the concept “fits” and “works”, 
is related to the consequences of the concept; the result of creating concepts is to produce 
concepts that are important and can have general applicability. While the theme is concerned 
with “fitting” with the text, this is only insofar as it can describe the content. The theme 
acknowledges the “reduction” of the notion it seeks to describe, and makes recognizable a 
relation to the universal essence without purporting to be the universal rule, as the concept 
does. To reiterate, the difference between the explanation of the text and the description is its 
implications for the interpretation of the phenomenon. The notion of a description is related 
to an appearance, something that is not concretely related, but is aesthetically. That 
appearance is the universal quality. The theme represents one possible universal. On the 
other hand, the notion of an explanation gives reason to the behaviours it explains. Further, 
the concept shows the intention of the action in a way that can rationally explain other 
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behaviours as well. There is an elucidated concern with the concept’s purpose, that it is 
generally clarifying many kinds of behaviour; whereas the theme is a representation of an 
ineffable essence, that it is only one possibility among many, and not a testable or practically 
relevant explanation of the phenomenon. The theme seeks a deeper relation to the content. 
Not only does it seek to describe it, that description is radically related to the universal, social 
quality of the human condition. The question of the concept is what does this explain, 
whereas the question of the theme is what essence makes this description possible. 
Elaborating on Glaser & Strauss, Prus refers to concepts as generic social processes. 
He defines these kinds of concepts as, 
The transsituational elements of interaction...denoting parallel 
sequences of activity across diverse contexts, generic social 
processes highlight the emergent, interpretive features of 
association. They focus our attention on the activities involved 
in the “doing” or accomplishing of human group life. (Prus 
1996:142) 
The “transsituational” orientation of the generic social process appeals to the creation 
of concepts that are empirically grounded and applicable to all situations. This implies that 
activity is categorical, that it can be characterized, and that those characterizations are valid 
across every situation. The generic social process is focused on the creation of a generic, 
generalizable concept. While the above describes an interpretive nature of the method for 
creating the generic social process, the “features of association” suggests an interest in 
characterized relationships to things.  
The method of creating a concept that is generalizable requires a categorical relation 
to the world and the phenomenon under study. Naming, grouping behaviours together, 
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assumes the whatness of the phenomenon. The name is a result of the research’s desire to 
make categorical groups; it is not driven by the desire to understand the meaning of the 
experience, only to name and group the experience. The meaning is lost if it is assumed, and 
the action and its significance is typified. Hermeneutic phenomenology looks for the deeper 
meaning of the phenomenon, but does not assume the meaning of the experience or its 
essence. This allows for the significant relationship between the universal essence and the 
particular experience to emerge through interpretation with the text and the creation of 
themes.  
Building further on the implications of the four above methodological statements of 
the concept in symbolic interaction, to develop the concept, the data must be coded. Coding 
involves searching for repeated patterns in the data to formulate categories that both group 
and explain the data. Essentially, coding looks for what is already there. It is a counting 
procedure that groups repeated words or phrases, for example, and the researcher develops 
the concept based on its ability to explain the majority of the data. The theme, however, does 
not emerge through a counting of repeated words. The theme is developed through 
reflexively engaging the text to find what is not present in the text, but is ineffably present, 
making the text’s speech possible and rational. As a description of what is there, the theme 
illuminates something about the text that is only present through reflexive engagement. The 
theme desires to make sense of the text, but does not explain it; it does not give reason to the 
data, but instead locates it in the realm of possible human experiences. In other words, the 
theme is not coding, it searches for something that essentially there, not necessarily repeated. 
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Following the method outlined in the symbolic interaction tradition, to carry out this 
kind of research, the creation of concepts would seek to both accurately explain addiction as 
well as other kinds of social action. Concepts would be focused on linking the current study’s 
research to other concepts and themes from other, past studies, as well as proposing new 
concepts to test in future research. For example, to look at the lifecycle, or the process of 
getting involved, of addiction, the research would try to create concepts that both explain 
how addicts go through the cycle of addiction, as well as explain how someone might also 
get involved in a career of, say, sports. The data would modify other, past concepts that 
explain the lifecycle of sports, to now include an explanation of the addict’s lifecycle. As 
well, symbolic interaction research would focus on creating concepts that explain addiction, 
but that could also explain other kinds of action. In this way, the focus would be on a process 
of meaning negotiation that is generically oriented, rather than on a phenomenological kind 
of meaning that is experientially located in the particularity of addiction, but also socially 
connected to the universal nature of any possible human experience. The concept explains 
and is concerned with universal applicability, whereas the theme is universally related in that 
it is a possible human experience.  
Further, the concept is the final product from a symbolic interaction analysis. The 
purpose of that research is to create testable concepts that viably explain particular data, and 
that can be applied and generalized to any behaviour. Hermeneutic phenomenological 
research uses the theme in a different way. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the theme is a 
tool that starts to unravel the mystery of the text’s essential aspects. The theme is part of the 
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analysis but not the final product. The theme is not generalizable, but is instead a reduction of 
a deeper experience. Because the theme is not an object of the text, it has an interpretive 
quality that is accounted for in its very creation; themes are brought out through work with 
the text as one possible path to one possible essence. The theme is related to the universal, 
social quality of action in that the universal essence is what makes the particular experience a 
possible one. The theme is not meant for testing or application to verifiable experiences or 
expression. The theme is something that emerges through the hermeneutic encounter with the 
text, so the theme emerges from the human experience, but the theme is only part of a larger 
analysis that aims at the deeper understanding of the phenomenon and its relationship to the 
human condition.  
4.5 Lostness: A Thematic Understanding of Addiction and Recovery 
Now that I have described what the theme is and its significance in relation to the 
hermeneutic phenomenological analysis, as well as its distinction from the concept in other 
interpretive traditions, I will thematically tease out the theme of lostness that will lead to my 
analysis in the following chapter. While the theme emerges through working with the text, I 
will first present various texts that will constitute my materials for developing the theme of 
lostness. Following the materials, I will then go through the texts, putting them in 
conversation with one another to show how the theme of lostness describes the content of the 
materials and makes the experience of addiction and recovery possible experiences. 
Additionally, this chapter will lead into the analysis by establishing the temporal relation of 
lostness to the essential quality of the theme.  
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I was a very shy person. I failed grade two, um, I was always 
yelled at, I stuttered an awful lot. I had hand-me-down clothes 
from my uncle who was about 5 years older than me. I mean, 
we had money we had a nice house and that. But I could just 
never approach people and talk to them – I was shy. And 
growing up I was always a hanger on to a follow – not a leader 
a follower – I’d follow people around. But I did sports a lot of 
gymnastics as well, baseball and hockey – it was always team 
sports and I wouldn’t open my mouth at all. So, when I got into 
high school I still didn’t fit in, but once I had that alcohol I fit 
in with people now, right? I’d do my hair, have a moustache – 
that was in the late sixties early seventies. I fit right in. I got 
into a group that accepted me and I could drink as much as 
they could. (Alex) 
For Alex’s particular experience, addiction was the feeling of wandering, of having 
no direction. The words “shyness” and “I wouldn’t open my mouth” reveal a lack of 
confidence. Similarly, having clothes passed on from an older family member suggests a 
feeling of insignificance, of not being worthy of personal and new belongings. For the lived 
experience of addiction, this particular text illuminates sense of no direction. He not only 
feels doubt about his ability to lead, he is a “follower”, but also feels as if he is not a worthy 
leader. But, when the experience of alcohol is present, Alex feels guided, confident and 
“accepted”. Here, the deeper implications are that Alex is making sense of his addiction, and 
he talks about his past as if it is the reason he became an alcoholic. In giving the accounts 
about his past, having hand me downs, being yelled at by his father, he speaks about his past 
as if it was a time of not fitting in and lostness, but also that he feels determined by his past; 
his understands his alcoholism as a solution to the problem of his not fitting in during his 
childhood. Although Alex says that he understands his addiction as an illness and craving for 
alcohol, his speech here shows that his interpretive work relies on the understanding of 
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alcoholism as the solution to the feeling of lostness, being accepted, social, fitting in to the 
group. 
For the experience of lostness, this particular experience reveals that wandering, 
being undirected and unworthy of leading, is related to addiction insofar as drinking is the 
solution to the missing confidence. The experience of addiction is interpreted as  being 
guided by alcohol, and lost without that guidance. Alcohol, if it is a solution, shows that 
Alex’s desire is to solve the problem of fitting in. Alex’s understanding of addiction relies on 
his desire to belong and to fit in. The experience of addiction is the desire to fit in.  
What that is, is that it gets to a point where it doesn’t do the 
trick anymore.  Because it doesn’t fill the hole in your soul 
anymore.  It doesn’t hide you from yourself anymore.  So it’s 
not taking you out of yourself anymore.  It’s just, you’re 
drinking, but you’re not getting the effects.  Whatever that 
booze was when I was thirteen, I don’t know what it was.  I 
would drink and I could feel it go down, and it hit my stomach, 
and it, it like, woosh!  You know, like those commercials, 
where the Baileys comes out?  And I know you can’t see that 
[gestures with hands].  But, that feeling of “I am hot, I have 
arrived”.  I’m thirteen, ninety pounds, bowl haircut, and I think 
I’m the hottest thing since sliced bread, right?  And it was—I 
always chase that feeling.  And when I speak, when I talk about 
it with Alcoholics Anonymous, I call it my first love.  Alcohol 
told me it loved me, it would never leave me, and it would 
make me feel 100 percent, like a million dollars every time.  
But it lied.  It didn’t do that for me.  It did for a while, but then 
it stopped.  I had to drink, right.  And I could always find any 
excuse if I am trying to have a drink.  You know, whatever, oh, 
it’s Sunday, I’m watching golf, I must have a ceasar.  You 
know, you can’t watch golf and have a glass of water.  So it 
gets easier.  And you may want to stop, but you can’t.  It’s a 
part of who you are (Jennifer) 
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The addiction is described as a hole in the soul, a bottomless pit. For Jennifer, she 
drank to chase the first high from alcohol, but after a while, “it stopped” giving her the 
desired effects of drinking. The bottomless pit of drinking is revealed by her discussion of the 
inability to stop, that she must keep drinking to chase the first high, the desired effects of 
alcohol. Chasing in an interesting idea, it is as if she is pursuing something concrete, perhaps 
her first alcohol experience. But, in relation to the bottomless pit of drinking, it suggests that 
she is chasing it down a rabbit hole, an unending and unrewarding pursuit. For the experience 
of lostness, this suggests that being lost can, indeed, have a sense of following or direction, in 
contrast to Alex’s experience, but that that pursuit never ends, has no destination. In that 
way, it is reminiscent of the misdirection imagery in Alex’s text.  
Also similar to Alex is Jennifer’s relationship to her past. She speaks about chasing 
her past experience of being thirteen and having that first elated experience with alcohol. For 
Jennifer, she, too, understands her addiction as determined by her past, as though that past 
experience is causing her to continue to drink. When Jennifer speaks, her past, first, thirteen-
year-old experience incites her drinking, that she is determined by this past experience, that 
she must keep drinking in order to feel that same feeling, of “being hot”. She makes sense of 
her addiction as if alcohol is in order to experience feeling desired and attractive. Alcohol is 
the solution to the problem of not feeling desired, being loved. Drinking allowed her to feel 
desirable, and she “chased” that feeling by drinking. When she says that alcohol no longer 
lets her feel hot or loved, she attributes her alcoholism to the need to feel attractive. By 
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saying that she chased that first experience of being hot, her interpretive work shows that her 
understanding of alcoholism is the desire to solve the problem of being attractive. 
Further, Jennifer’s speech also describes the futility of the pursuit of the desire to feel 
attractive. This sheds light on the angst associated with the lostness and unsatisfied pursuit of 
the effects of drinking. The futility of the pursuit is part of the AA discourse of helplessness, 
that addicts are helpless against their desires to stop. Here, as shown, Jennifer talks as though 
her alcoholism is part of this craving, the inability to stop drinking, but instead, her talk is not 
only part of the AA discourse, but she is relying on an understanding of alcoholism as the 
solution to the problem of feeling desirable. Her deeper problem is the desire to feel and 
know if she is attractive.  
I would make up lies, because I knew at one point, if the girls 
at work asked me to go out for supper, and if they were having 
a drink I knew I couldn’t go because I couldn’t stop at one 
drink.  So I made excuses.  It ruined a lot of family functions.  
It ruined a lot of time with my grandchildren when they were 
first little, because I would always make an excuse that I 
wasn’t feeling well on weekends, while I would be too drunk to 
travel.  But I think that it not only destroys you, it destroys all 
those around you who you care about because they can see 
what it’s doing to you.  But I was in denial.  I had a drinking 
problem, but I couldn’t stop.  At first I didn’t think that I had a 
problem, and it didn’t bother me, but then there was a point 
when I couldn’t stop.  And they know you can’t stop, but 
there’s nothing they can do about it.  They try, but as an 
alcoholic, I put up my defenses and say, no, I don’t need help, 
I’m ok, I can stop anytime I want, I don’t drink too much. 
(Kathy) 
Kathy says her addiction isolated her from relationships. She says that she “made up 
lies” and “excuses” to purposefully exclude herself from her friends and family because of 
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her embarrassment about her drinking. Her deliberate self-exclusion demonstrates that her 
isolation is treated as a kind of solution to her drinking; she knows that her drinking is not 
socially acceptable, but she also denies it. Her denial is in light of her recovery. Kathy 
reflects on her isolating drinking practices, calling it denial, but only does so in relation to the 
present. In recovery she sees her denial as being disconnected from her past. For Kathy, she 
was unable to change her addiction because she would not accept her past drinking practices. 
Kathy speaks about her denial in a way that determines her. Kathy says the denial of her past 
made her unable to stop drinking. Denial is an interesting problem; Kathy speaks about 
denial as if it was the force making her unable to see the problem and stop drinking. The 
denial led to her lies about being ill instead of seeing her grandchildren, it caused her to keep 
drinking because she “could stop anytime she wanted”. Denial itself has an interesting 
relationship to time and the past. Denial is a way of feeling determined by the past all the 
while not acknowledging it. 
For the experience of lostness as few key points here. In addition to Kathy’s feelings 
of misguidedness, that she did indeed have a drinking problem she refused to admit, the 
lostness Kathy felt was her disconnect from her past. Without realizing her past practices, she 
continued to act as if things were status quo. However, once Kathy came to see her drinking 
as a problem she was able to change her perspective on her past drinking. For Kathy, she 
describes her drinking as something that she “couldn’t stop”, in contrast to Jennifer’s pursuit 
of the effects of drinking. Kathy’s sense of misguidedness stemmed from her deliberate 
isolation as a solution to her desire to drink heavily. For Jennifer and Alex, lostness and the 
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misguidedness has to do more with being undirected and pursuing a futile end. In saying that 
she “couldn’t stop” the lostness of denial illuminates the way that a person can feel lost 
because they have no sense of their past.  
Yeah, well, again the coping, well, um, you know when I 
needed to deal with my problems I would have a couple drinks, 
you know. I’m not talking fall-down drunk, I would have a 
problem then take a couple drinks. Then I would try and figure 
out my issue. I found that sometimes it worked, but of course, 
the more I began drinking, when I sat down and started to 
drink, the more it became warped – my thinking and the 
problem solving didn’t really work. But actually created more 
problems, but I was thinking solving problems. It was coping 
in the way of being able to communicate. Being able to 
approach people. Um, kinda made me fit it, you know – it 
broke a lot of barriers, emotionally. Emotional barriers. And 
so, that’s how I used it, to cope. (Ned) 
For Ned, coping and his “need to deal with problems” were his admitted reasons for 
drinking. If he turned to the bottle for his coping and support for dealing with trouble, this 
shows how he found friendly comfort in alcohol and drinking. Similar to Alex’s text, alcohol 
was Ned’s solution to the desire to “approach people” and to “fit in”. Like the other texts 
seen thus far, Ned reflects on those thoughts as being misguided. The recovery perspective is 
shown through Ned’s use of the words “didn’t really work”. He sees those past experiences 
as not only misguided but as a pre-understanding. Prior to his recovery, the support he sought 
in the bottle was seen as comforting. Now, in his current understanding of his drinking, he 
reflects on those practices as wrong, “creating more problems” rather than “solving 
problems”. Bringing the last few texts together that connected on a theme of misguidedness, 
like this text does as well, bring new light to the development of the theme of lostness. 
 
 99 
Alex’s desire for acceptance, Jennifer’s love of alcohol and its effects, Kathy’s solution of 
isolation, and now Ned’s comfort and support for dealing with trouble are all related to a 
notion of a pre-understanding, looking back on past drinking practices. For lostness, then, the 
experience of misguidedness or misdirection comes into play with the experience of looking 
back, reflecting on the past. The past is seen as a time when the practices were a time of pre-
understanding of reality. The misguided perspective of the past was an experience of 
wandering, searching for the truth; now, the past is a time of lostness, and the present is a 
time of understanding. Further, the past is treated as something that determined their 
becoming an alcoholic and their ability to quit drinking. To say that the past was a time of 
misunderstanding or lostness, implies that the conditions of the past were causing their 
addiction. Let us consider one further example of reflection and pre-understanding in relation 
to the past.  
And I don’t have a desire to drink; I don’t think of drinking. 
But I think of what alcoholism has done in the past by tearing 
away my whole social life and taking it away because of my 
alcoholic thinking. And my alcoholic thinking is the “ism” that 
I call in the fact that it affects every thought pattern; everything 
I do. So I have to dismiss that, I have to get rid of that. I have 
to look at many selves. Self delusion, lying to myself – there 
are many selves and I can’t think of them all right now but the 
book is based on the idea that there is selves. And if get into 
myself then I will go back to that way of life, so I can’t do that. 
(Joe) 
Joe refers to his “alcoholic thinking” as part of his past. This suggests that, for him, 
there was something significantly different about his past perspective and thinking from the 
present. For Joe, the past entailed a “desire to drink” that affected “every thought pattern”. 
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The addiction, for Joe, was his overwhelming desire for alcohol; it was part of his everyday 
life. Alcoholism is the perpetrator that was “tearing away” his social life. There is a reference 
here to being a victim of the alcoholism while simultaneously treating it as self-possession, 
that it was his thinking. In this regard, Joe alcoholism and desire to drink, as perpetrator, not 
only was a misguided way of thinking, but it misled him. The notion of misleading that Joe is 
discussing is how he refers to his past when speaking about his recovery. When he switches 
to the present tense, he talks about what he has to do in the present to avoid being misled by 
alcohol and his past perspective. By the use of the two different tenses to describe his past 
desire and present recovery, Joe’s reflection on his pre-understanding is a condemning one. 
He refers to his pre-understanding as a separate self, that his present self is different than that 
of the past. In this way Joe’s intentions are to lead his new self away from alcohol and the 
desire to drink to avoid “going back to that [pre-understanding] way of life”. For the essential 
quality of lostness, Joe’s orientation to his past as a pre-understanding that misled him 
demonstrates how the past can bring out a kind of angst in relation to its perspective and 
subsequent acts. In speaking about the past as something that determines him, bringing about 
alcoholism, the present is a time that he must act, have agency over the past. This leads to 
anxiety as the past is spoken about as an entity determining his alcohol addiction, but it is not 
a real “thing”, per se. Joe talks about the past as something that he is, but should not be 
anymore. This is a real struggle in Joe’s text, as he tries to work through his relationship to 
the past as one that he treats as causing him to drink uncontrollably, but also that he must, in 
the present, take responsibility for himself, be the self that is not addicted. The feeling of 
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lostness, then, in alcoholism is the experience of anxiety towards the past, that the past is 
something separate from the present, but it is also part of what constitutes being in the 
present. 
By looking at the above few quotations one possible theme has been used to develop 
the phenomenon, what is one possible essential about the lived experience of addiction and 
recovery. The work with the materials is what brings about the transformation from the 
actualities of the anecdotes and stories of the experience with addiction and recovery from 
each interviewee. In looking beyond the words, using a reflexive hermeneutic thematic 
structure, my inquiry sought to tease out one possible essential about the phenomenon. What 
culminated through the work with the theme and the materials was that lostness is related to 
the way the addict relates to time. For the alcoholic, addiction is seen in relation to time as a 
period of pre-understanding, a wrong, misleading or misguided understanding, about which 
the alcoholic harbours some anxiety. From this anxiety emerges a desire for permanence in 
the present, not wanting to “slip back” into past practices and perspectives. The past is 
treated as a separate time, part of the journey to the present. The AA voices heard in this 
chapter relate to the past as something that determines them insofar as alcoholism is the 
solution to a past problem. In speaking about their addiction as solutions to problems, the 
members show themselves and their interpretive work as struggling to understand their 
addiction not only as a cravings of the body, but that alcoholism is related to deeper desires, 
such as fitting in. Further, there is an anxiety about the past in the texts here as the addicts 
speak about recovery as the need to have agency over the past, no longer allowing it to 
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determine their alcoholism. The task of my analysis is to further develop the relationship 
between the past (addiction) and the present (recovery) by formulating a theoretical 
understanding of the past. This requires me to engage the existential of temporality to further 
explore the relationship between the desire for alcohol and recovery as the understanding of 
time. 
This preliminary analysis of the data has brought out a phenomenon that can be 
addressed in a focused and sustained manner. Using the theme of lostness as a tool to work 
through lived experience descriptions, there appears to be a relationship between the 
experience of time, particularly the past and the present, and the phenomenon of addiction 
and recovery. Not only are alcoholics treating their past as a separate time, a time of lostness, 
that determined their addiction, they are also anxious about the past. For the proceeding 
analysis, it will be beneficial to further phenomenologically develop the experience of lived 
time, the experience of time, and the understanding of time in relation to these materials and 
the phenomenon of addiction and recovery. The development of an existential frame of 
reference will help the inquiry delve deeper into the lived experience of the phenomenon by 
exposing the being, the lived experience, of time in addiction and recovery. In the following 






The theme of lostness served as a tool that benefitted the analysis of the materials 
selected from the alcoholics anonymous members insofar as it provided a way of looking at 
the texts in a way that transformed the materials and drew the inquiry closer to the essential 
quality of the lived experience of addiction and recovery. As demonstrated, the theme of 
lostness was not imposed onto the materials as a concept might be, but rather was used 
instrumentally to open up a possible essential of the lived experience of the phenomenon. 
After the development of the materials, the description of addiction and recovery was shown 
to be an experience relating to lived time. In the texts, the speakers reflected on their 
experiences with addiction as a time of misdirection, lostness, misguidedness. Speaking from 
a present relation to addiction, their experiences with recovery reflected on the past with 
anxiety, separating their present being from the being of their past. It was through this 
orientation of the texts that leads to an analysis of the phenomenon of addiction as it is lived 
temporally.  
In this chapter I will address this lived experience description of addiction and 
recovery by developing a theoretical frame of reference for temporality. This will allow the 
inquiry to form a relation to both the particular experiences (texts) used in the Materials 
chapter, as well as to address a collective, universal relation to lived time. In this way, the 
theoretical development of temporality, as an existential of the lived experience, will 
phenomenologically and dialectically inform my analysis. In the previous chapter, the 
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particular experiences opened up a way to analyze the phenomenon in relation to a universal, 
existential experience of lived time. Using temporality as a theoretical frame that understands 
and sees these particular texts, as well as shows how the particular texts informed this lens, 
the phenomenological experience of the being of addiction and recovery will be a temporal 
experience.  
In this section, the focus will be on the development of this temporal framework to 
strengthen the essential experience of time in relation to addiction. The framework will 
provide a way of seeing the lived experience in a way that tries to make the ineffable visible. 
Of the many possible essential experiences of addiction and recovery, this framework will be 
a way of seeing only one, in this case, lived time. As I move through the development of 
temporality, I will dialectically reengage the lived experience description and phenomenon to 
strengthen my case as well as my framework. In this way, temporality represents the 
universal or collective appearance of time, and I will demonstrate how seeing through the 
lens of this appearance is a way of making visible the essential and lived experience of my 
phenomenon.  Some of the ways that I will address the particularity of my phenomenon will 
be using my framework to see how the addict’s experience of time is different than the 
nonaddict’s experience of time. Likewise, I will also explore how an existential relation to 
time in this case of addiction and recovery is a way of seeing the essential, universal 
experience of lived time. I will now begin to work with some key texts that I have selected to 
develop this notion of lived time. 
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Van Manen describes lived time as “subjective time...our temporal way of being in 
the world” (Van Manen 2006:104). Lived time has both a particular and a universal relation 
to being. On the one hand, time is a subjective experience; each person experiences time in 
their own way, and in relation to their conscious presence and existence in time. Universally 
speaking, time is a collective experience because, although it is subjectively particular, it is 
universally experienced; the passing and unfolding of time is a collective experience, no one 
lives a static life. Everyone lives in time, but it is this analysis’ interest to develop how it is 
that people relate to the passing of time. For this, I will now turn to phenomenological roots 
of temporality and consciousness. 
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time situated the coming into being of consciousness 
as a temporal relation.  
Dasein’s Being finds its meaning in temporality. But 
temporality is also the condition which makes historicality 
possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself 
possesses, regardless of whether or how Dasein is an entity “in 
time”... In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, 
and it is “what” it already was. It is its past, whether explicitly 
or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, 
pushing itself along “behind” it, and that Dasein possesses 
what is past as a property which is still present at-hand and 
which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein “is” its past 
in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, 
“historizes” out of its future on each occasion. (Heidegger 
2008:41) 
While the culmination of Heidegger’s work addresses the way that time has been 
misconceptualized since the time of antiquity, this passage, nevertheless, contributes to a 
framework for temporality through its acknowledgement of the present experience and its 
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relation to the past. Heidegger says that being finds its meaning in the relation between 
Dasein and temporality. Dasein is a term that represents a characterization of a relation 
between an entity (human) and its relation to being-there. Sein is German for the verb to be, 
and Da means there. Dasein is to-be there, it is the being that has a way of being there, 
present. In other words, this way of being is the Dasein’s self-understanding.  
The Dasein finds itself always already understanding the things alongside it, entities. 
What is understood is the being of an object, what is given to Dasein in its commerce with 
them, what the entity is, its whatness, and what it is in order to do. Entities are given in a way 
that makes what is there (entity) accessible to a relation to Being. Dasein can relate to entities 
and objects because, in understanding what they are in order to, Dasein understands itself and 
what it is for the sake of. If a hammer is in order to build a table, Dasein knows it is for the 
sake of building a table. 
Heidegger explains Dasein’s self-understanding is made possible on the horizon of 
Temporality. Everyday time, treated here as an entity, is given in a way that the Dasein has 
access to its own understanding of the whatness of events in relation to time, “it is time for 
this”, or “it is not yet time for that”. It is that relation to time that allows for Dasein to 
understand happening, the givenness of time allows Dasein to understand itself. In saying “it 
is time for this”, the Dasein understands that what it is for the sake of now. In this way, 
Dasein’s relation to self-understanding and happening (historicality) is a temporal one. 
Heidegger says that Dasein is its past, its already-has-been-ness. Considering the 
temporality of Dasein, this illuminates self-understanding as a relationship between the past 
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as a thing, and what the past gives by way of understanding the present happening. 
Happening is Dasein’s understanding of the relationship between the past as a region of 
events, and also the past as what makes possible the understanding of the present. Happening 
is what makes Being possible. The experience of time is this relationship to the past as both 
an entity and a way of understanding the present.  
This development reveals that the relationship to the past has a dualism: the past can 
be treated as something that is external, a series of events, a region of things that happened, 
and so on; but, the past is also “how I am myself”. This relationship to the past allows a 
subject to engage with the past as a thing, an entity, but also gives the subject (consciousness, 
Dasein) a way of understanding and being in the present moment and situation. The addict’s 
understanding of recovery, then, can be a way of relating to the past as events of addiction, 
but also is a way of understanding the meaning of sobriety and recovery. Recovery is thus 
demonstrated as both an existential relation to the past as a series of actions, understandings, 
and moments in time, and also as an essential relation, as the past gives the addict access to a 
way of being (a relation to recovery). Temporality is the very way that addicts can 
understand recovery.  
So, addiction and recovery are experiences made possible by a temporal relation to 
them. Recalling the lived experience description of the anxiety toward time, the analysis will 
now move in a direction to dialectically engage this problem from the foundational 
statements of Heidegger. Consider Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s description of time as a 
necessary experience of consciousness: 
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Time is thought of by us before its parts, and temporal relations 
make possible the events in time. Correspondingly, therefore, 
the subject, must not be himself situated in it, in order to be 
able to be present in intention to the past as to the future. Let us 
no longer say that time is a ‘datum of consciousness’; let us be 
more precise and say that consciousness deploys or constitutes 
time. (Merleau-Ponty 1962:481) 
Heidegger’s notion of Being as made possible by happening shapes Being as 
something prior to the recognition or designation of entities or events. While consciousness 
acknowledges that events are real through the movement of acknowledgement (of entities), 
the experience of Being occurs prior to that movement. The very looking at an object 
(recognition) is in a way that makes that looking possible. Being is the giveness that is given 
by the object in such a way that the givenness is accessible to Dasein. It is through this 
foundational statement that time, as something that is given, is “thought of by us before its 
parts”. The events of time are given in such a way that they are accessible to Dasein and the 
understanding of happening. This temporality, this experience that is prior to thought, is what 
makes Being possible in relation to the events of time. Lived time is not an entity; lived time 
is the temporal relation that makes possible the givenness of happening (the events in time).  
Lived time is the presence prior to the experience as an event. It is in this way that 
Dasein is not situated in an event, but, rather, that the subject is in relation to what time has 
given her. Merleau-Ponty is making a distinction between the past as an entity, that people 
are not entities to their past, nor entities in the present, but that they are entities made 
possible by their access to the givenness of the past and the happening of the present-oriented 
future. He says this is due to an intentional relation to time (past and future). Insofar as the 
givenness needs to be given in a way that a subject can enter into a relation to what is and 
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what is there (an entity), there is an intentional comportment to Being. Being does not just 
happen; the intentionality of the subject is what makes the givenness of an entity or event 
meaningful, significant. So, while temporality is prior to the relation between consciousness 
and object, it is the subject that acts towards entities through entering into a meaningful 
relation with the givenness of what is there.  
Merleau-Ponty says that time is not a “datum of consciousness” and that 
“consciousness deploys time”. The former statement articulates that time is not merely an 
entity of consciousness; as demonstrated through Heidegger, time is a prior condition of 
consciousness, and makes Being possible. The latter statement refers to the intentional 
comportment of time; consciousness organizes the givenness of time in a directed and 
engaged way to make experience meaningful. This is the movement between the Dasein and 
the relation to the event of time.  
Remembering the lived experience description of addiction and recovery, anxiety is a 
way of treating time and the past events. In this way subjects can act towards the past (time) 
in a way that is regretful, anxious, or even deny the past, because the manner in which 
consciousness organizes the experiences and understandings of time is a way that allows the 
subject to make meaning however she likes out of the movement of recognizing the events. 
However, interestingly, the addict can say that they are no longer an addict, but they always 
are an addict insofar as their current Being is historically related to the present. To further 
consider this notion I will now to turn Jean Paul Sartre. 
The term “was” is a mode of being. In this sense I am my past. 
I do not have it; I am it. A remark made by someone 
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concerning an act which I performed yesterday or a mood 
which I had does not leave me indifferent; I am hurt or 
flattered, I protest or I let it pass; I am touched to the quick. I 
do not dissociate myself from my past. Of course, in time, I can 
attempt this dissociation; I can declare that “I am no longer 
what I was,” argue that there has been a change, progress. But 
this is a matter of a secondary reaction which is given as such. 
To deny my solidarity of being with my past at this or that 
particular point is to affirm it for the whole of my life. (Sartre 
1956:168-169) 
It seems as though the development of this framework has moved into a way of 
understanding in relation to the past, and yet see the past as something that is no longer “how 
I am myself”. There appears to be a tension between treating an event of the past as no longer 
part of a self-understanding or way of being, all the while it is that very way of being that 
allows for the present understanding. It is this tension that Sartre develops in the above 
passage. Sartre says that the verb, the action of being, is itself a way of Being. By stating that 
one is some thing (adjective), Dasein is intentionally aligning its relationship with being to 
the givenness of a particular quality or experience. Through the subject’s intentional use of 
the being verb, the subject asserts an entity’s Being as giving a self-meaningfulness. Sartre is 
arguing that the verb’s usage itself, the intention-towards the self designation, is how the 
subject constitutes her way of Being to herself, through speech. For this reason, saying that 
one was some thing (adjective) is acknowledging that experience as part of what constitutes 
the present being. But the use of was also demonstrates a kind of intentionality towards the 
past that disavows it in the present. 
Sartre says that the action of denying the past, saying that one was and no longer is, is 
a further example of intention towards the constitution of Being. Despite speech that may 
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deny the past or that Dasein’s Being continues to be the past, the past is still present in 
Dasein’s Being because the denial in fact affirms the past’s presence. What Sartre calls the 
“secondary reaction” is the conscious reconstituting of Being, making time meaningful. The 
intention towards Being is the reliance on the past as making the present possible. While time 
is prior to Being insofar as it allows for Dasein to have a relationship to the givenness of 
entities, treating time as an entity is a secondary movement only made possible by time and 
happening itself. As well, intentional reflection on the past, treating the events as entities, in a 
way that denies the past as belonging to the present way of being affirms the past. Denying 
the past is also a way of acknowledging it. While the subject may state that “I am no long 
what I was”, this statement relies on the past, demonstrating that the subject was once, once 
is, and therefore is still the past but only in a present way of Being. For an addict to state that 
“I am no longer an addict”, this statement affirms that she was once an addict, and that past 
has constituted her Being through its relation to historicality. While the statement expresses a 
denial of the past way of Being, addiction, the possibility of the assertion to deny the past 
affirms that the speaker was in fact an addict. 
The denial of time is the intentional movement of the subject towards the events of 
time. While the subject is very much an essential a part of her past temporally, the denial of 
time illuminates the way the subject’s relation to the past changes. The intentional 
comportment of existence allows the subject to relate to the givenness of the events of the 
past in a way that alters the past’s meaningfulness. As Sartre explained above, there is great 
emotion associated with the recollection of a denied past, a lived experience of emotion that 
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is alive to the past during its very denial. This meaningfulness that is an emotionally lived 
experience finds its presence in the addict’s relation to time and intentionality towards it as 
an event (entity) in memory. 
Van Manen states that “The past changes under the pressures and influences of the 
present” (2006:104). How does the past change if the past’s events are unchangeable in the 
persisting passing of time? The influence of the present is the movement between the subject 
and the event. The change that occurs can only be designated to the meaning ascription that 
is made possible through the affirmation of the past through the present recollection of it. 
Lived time is the intentionality of the subject towards the events of the past. The memories of 
the past gain significance in hindsight, and through Dasein’s engagement with the past as an 
entity. This reflection is what both shapes the memories of the past, the encounter with its 
events, as well as the emotional experience of the present. 
The addict’s engagement with the past and its related emotions of anxiety and worry 
emerge through the addict’s relation to time. As developed in the framework for temporality, 
the addict is essentially related to the past through its part in constituting the present. The 
notion of lived time illuminated the emotional experience of reflecting on the past. While 
addicts may deny their past, saying they are no longer addicts and intentionally relating to 
their past in a way that alters its significance to them, their lived experiences of addiction and 
recovery are phenomenologically related to temporal memory. The act of recalling the past in 
a way that is significantly different temporally affirms the past’s role in the present 
happening, as well as demonstrates that the past has an emotional affectivity that becomes 
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significant through the addict’s relationship to it. To further explore the way that the addict’s 
relation to the past is possible through a temporal relation to memory, two more texts about 
memory will be considered to further develop this analytic focus. 
What is the relationship between Dasein’s intentionality towards the past and the 
significance it has emotionally in memory? What does it mean to say that memory alters the 
past, if time is the (temporal) pre-understanding that allows the present to happen and be 
understood? 
Memory constructs the past and reconstructs it. This is not a 
question of revising the facts but, as with the modifications in 
neurological pathways, of placing experiential information in 
new – sometimes larger and richer – contexts. In that sense, the 
past changes under the pressure of the present, as well as vice 
versa. (Hoffman 2009:108) 
Developing from the temporal framework that this chapter has been assembling, the 
construction of memory appears to be related to the intentional comportment of Being. But 
what does it mean for memory to both construct and deconstruct the past? What is the 
relationship of memory to constructing and dismantling and reconstructing? How is this 
possible? To begin with the first assertion in the first sentence, memory constructs the past, 
suggests a peculiar characteristic to say that memory, something retroactive, is active in 
recollection. Memory as a construction is related to the temporal relation to Being insofar as 
the past connects Being to its presentness in the world; this was developed above in the 
temporal framework. The characterization of an active memory is the mode in which the 
experience and relationship to the past shapes the way the present is understood, but also the 
way that the present is remembered. The experience of the moment is made possible through 
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the historicality of Being, as well as the intentional comportment towards the events of time; 
it becomes significant in this process and is understood and stored as such. Recollection is 
being alive to that construction as if it is happening now, directing consciousness towards the 
past (as an object). For addicts, this was illustrated by their reflections of the desire they have 
for alcohol. The addict’s memory of their first experience with alcohol, the “chase” of that 
first experience is the one way memory constructs the past. The first episode of drinking is 
remembered as an emotional experience. So, memory has an emotional relationship to the 
past. Memory is like an emotional lens that constructs the past; the events are given in such a 
way that Dasein engages them through that emotional remembrance.  
The temporality of memory is both Dasein’s accessibility to the present as made 
possible through the past, but also that Dasein’s intentional comportment relates to the way 
in which memory gives the event, and that mode of giving is essentially emotional. So what 
about the latter assertion in Hoffman’s first sentence, that memory reconstructs the past. This 
statement suggests that memory can dismantle and reassemble the past in new ways, that the 
past in memory is itself not fixed, but subject to ongoing reformation. The constancy of 
reformation is the dialogical relation between the memory of the past as related to by Dasein 
in the present, and Dasein’s reshaping of the past as re-engaged temporally in the present 
moment, temporally. This relation also appeared in the construction of the past. As such, the 
present both constructs the past, as well as reconstructs it. The act of remembering has both a 
temporal relation to the past as well as an intentional one in the present. To say this means 
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that memory is an intertwined happening between the temporal past as well as the intentional 
comportment as directed toward the past as an event.  
Before working through this statement, I will first, drawing on Hoffman’s own words, 
make a distinction between the intentional character of experiencing (remembering the past) 
and the notion of information reordering. To start with the latter, the reordering of 
information in a neurological sense, suggests that one’s relation to the past is merely a 
physical, plastic relation in the brain as it is able to recall particular events, and the 
information that is stored in them, such as emotions. Recollection in this sense is a series of 
brain happenings, as information is brought to fore and then processed in the now. The past, 
in this sense would be reordered as the information is changed in the present moment. This is 
different than the intentional comportment of experiencing. Additionally, reordering also 
suggests a relation to time that is merely informational. This could mean that Dasein’s 
relation to time is not emotional, that the reconstruction of events is only a reformed way of 
recalling and processing them, having no emotionality attached to the intentional judgement 
recollection and reconstruction implied in the case of this research focus. It is not my plan to 
work through neuroscience here or cognitive research on brain function, but to use this 
distinction between memory reconstruction as the reordering of information versus the 
emotional reconstruction of events as a way of identifying the difference between seeing the 
past as a piece of stored information and seeing the past as a temporal and emotional relation 
to the present.  
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The intentional comportment of memory is, as mentioned above, the happening 
between the temporal being, the past as constituting the present, as well as the way that 
Dasein makes significant the events of the past. As mentioned earlier, the memory, as such, 
constructs the past, as the emotional experience of events emphasizes the events’ significance 
in reflection. To say that memory reconstructs the past suggests that the present can reshape, 
rethink the past emotion and find new significance, meaning and interpretation for it in light 
of the passing of time. In such a way, being alive to the past moment can be found in an 
altered way in light of the present moment as it relates to the temporal character of being. 
The past makes the present possible, and through this unfolding of time, this changing of 
experience, the past’s events can be intentionally altered and reinterpreted in their 
significance. To further work through this dialogical relation, let us consider an example of 
the deconstruction and reconstruction of the past in addict interview material. 
It’s a very lonely and dark world because – I really can’t 
describe the feeling because you feel like there’s no hope.  You 
are in a black hole and it’s getting blacker and blacker and 
there’s no light left.  And you can’t get out. And, if I could 
come back to what it does, along with destroying everybody 
else, it kills you as a person.  And then I had to find myself 
again.  Once I found recovery, once I found that I didn’t have 
to drink, that I could cry if I did feel pain.  I had to learn who I 
was... I never felt like I was good enough, I was never good 
enough at school, I was never good enough as a wife, I was 
never good enough as a mother, I was never good enough as a 
daughter.  That’s how I felt.  Now I know that I am a good 
mother, I am a good sister, I am a good daughter.  I am a really 




To highlight the past in its relation to the present thematically in this quotation, Kathy 
is reflecting on her experience of addiction in light of “finding recovery”. There is 
juxtaposition in Kathy’s reflections that points to the reformation of her experiences in her 
past addiction, and her present experiences in recovery. When Kathy speaks about the past, 
she uses diction that is dark, overwhelming, and bound up with sad emotions. Her description 
of a black hole with “not light left” that “destroys” and “kills you as a person” are 
reminiscent of a time with no hope. Her present, however, is a more hopeful discussion. She 
says that she is “good enough” and is a “good person”. These two emotions in contrast show 
that who she is in her past is different than how she knows herself in the present. Knowing 
the self is a temporally lived experience. Kathy knows herself now in the present by deciding 
she is no longer her self in the past. She sees herself in relation to the past and can reconstruct 
her own relation to who she is now.  
The past allows Dasein to know itself in the present through reflexive returning to the 
present from the perspective of the past. Dasein can not only uncover the past in a way that 
changes its own emotional comportment toward the significance of the past events, but 
Dasein can also relate to itself in a way that knows itself presently through the past and also 
reconstructs the past through its intentional comportment toward the past as an object. Dasein 
encounters the past through being-in-the-world, Dasein is with its past insofar as it is how it 
knows itself. But the past, as an object, is disclosed in the same way as other objects in the 
world, and therefore its meaning and understanding of the past’s significance can change if 
Dasein decides to comport itself towards it in a way that changes its significance. In other 
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words, the understanding of the self emerges through both the past as making possible the 
present as well as by treating the past as an object that allows Dasein to know itself as a who, 
as a self. But, the past is also an object that reveals and unveils itself to Dasein in the way 
that all objects already do for Dasein. Dasein always already understands how to know itself 
through the past, and can change its self-understanding of the self by reflexively returning to 
its recollection of the past to decidedly change its significant relation to it. It is in this way 
that the pressure of the present is proverbially said to change the past.  
An extreme fragmentation of destructuring of time can become 
a torment, a nightmare in which we cannot make even minimal 
sense of our own experience. In order to know ourselves as 
selves at all – in order to perceive ourselves as subjects and 
sources of meaning – we need to re-cognise our existence over 
time. (Hoffman 2009:76) 
Remembering can mean great anxiety, as seen in the addict’s experience. The past 
can cause a fragmentation between the present self and the past understanding of the self. 
This fragmentation can become a nightmare if the present Dasein does not recognize that it 
can restructure the self in relation to time however it decides. It is necessary to reconstruct 
the past and the self in relation to the past to avoid the haunting anxiety can be possible if 
Dasein does not decide to be who it is by choosing to act and know itself in its own way. 
Because the ability to know the self and to understand the past is always already understood 
by Dasein, it is unthought, it is possible that Dasein may not intentionally decide to make 
itself.  
For addicts, recovery can only become possible if addicts decide to reengage who 
they are and what their past is in relation to who they want to be now. Addiction can become 
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a nightmare, a tormenting reality, if addicts do not choose to recognize and reorganize the 
past as a way they no longer are. Because the nature of the addict is to always already 
understand the past and their experiences as things that are real, it can be easily forgotten that 
the past has made it possible for them to understand themselves and that this understanding is 
what makes it possible for them to choose what is meaningful to them, what is significant, 
real to them. It is easy to forget that I choose what is meaningful to who I am when my 
ability to choose is natural to my being in the world. The lived experience of addiction and 
recovery can thus be seen as a lived experience of how addicts relate to their past. Recovery 
can only be possible once addicts recognize that their own understanding of things and their 
experiences not only make them who they are, but that it is possible to change the how-I-
know-myself of the present by reengaging the past as who they no longer are. In other words, 
recovery is only possible if addicts act like they chose addiction.  
The theoretic problem this analysis raises, that healing requires repossessing 
responsibility and embracing the agency of choice, has deeper implications for further 
exploration. In the voices in the Materials chapter, the interpretive work of the AA members 
relied on an understanding of being determined by the past. AA members understood their 
addiction as if alcohol was a solution to a problem, an external force from the past causing 
addiction, such as wearing hand-me-down clothes. Alcohol solved a deep desire, such as 
fitting in or feeling loved. Additionally, there was anxiety about the past, and the addict’s 




This chapter illuminated the existential problem of temporality as it relates to the 
anxiety about the past. The conclusions here described the theoretical problem of accepting 
the past as part of the possibilities for being who you already are.  It developed the necessity 
for repossessing the desire for recovery, not letting time, or the past, determine self-
understanding. For addiction, this helped us understand the anxiety of the past in the addict 
talk. The problem of the addict, as developed here, is to understand the past as who they are, 
part of their utmost possibilities. The addict texts in chapter four showed themselves as 
treating these past times of lostness as problems that determined their solutions; that is, they 
were drinking to solve a problem in their past, such as fitting in. In their reflection, the past 
drinking is seen as a ‘bad’ thing, drinking to solve problems is bad. In speaking, the addicts 
show that in recovery their alcoholism was misguided and wrong, whereas, in the present, 
choosing to take responsibility, acting like they choose recovery, was the good thing to do.  
The problem of the addict is one where he externalizes the bad. My conclusion suggests that 
he must merely take up his own possibilities now for the agency and reflection necessary for 
change, and to enjoy the good rewards of recovery. In other words, the addict will enjoy the 
good experience of recovery and healing if he acts like he chose his past, rather than 
externalizing it. What appears to be a deeper problem is that my solution suggests something 
more fundamentally relied on than a problem of agency. Instead, my conclusion brings the 
following into question: how is it that the bad is necessarily externalized? The addict treated 
alcoholism as if it was external, that it determined their choices. Further, the addict’s 
accomplishments, such as quitting drinking to recover and heal, are spoken of with self-
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possession and agency. The good experiences of healing are treated as results of agency, of 
self-action; whereas the bad experiences, the past addiction and its consequences, are treated 
as external problems imposed onto them. Here is a tension, a contradiction in the AA voices 
and my analysis of the existential relation to the anxiety about the past. This is one area that 







My thesis project was guided by the research question what is the lived experience of 
addiction and recovery? and the methodological handbook of Max Van Manen (2006). 
Following this guide, I moved through the chapters by first developing the theoretical and 
methodological orientation of the project. Then by working through some relevant and 
provoking literature about addiction and recovery I demonstrated a need for a research 
project guided by my question and hermeneutic phenomenological method. Following, I 
developed my interview materials as they related to the theme of lostness. From this work, 
addiction and recovery were revealed to have a relationship to time, particularly the past. To 
complete this analysis, I then developed a frame of reference of time that allowed us to re-
imagine addiction and recovery as they related to memory and the understanding of the self. 
In this final chapter, I will now briefly consider some implications of this project as whole, 
rearticulate the necessity of the hermeneutic phenomenology and its method, as opposed to 
symbolic interaction, as well as articulate some limitations of my project and places and 
direction for further development.  
6.1 Understanding the Whole 
While other research has sought to examine addiction and recovery by assuming their 
relation to disease, the body, the social system, among other orientations covered in the 
literature chapter, this thesis developed the phenomena of addiction and recovery through 
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engagements with lived experience descriptions in interview materials with AA members. By 
staying true to the phenomena of the experiences given by the AA interviews, this project 
developed in such a way that it transformed those experiences by imagining them in relation 
to time, particularly the past. To further my elaboration on the whole of this project, I want to 
develop an excerpt from Thomas De Quincey’s Confessions of an Opium Eater. In this 
passage, De Quincey is reflecting on his sense of time during his addiction to opium.  
The sense of space, and in the end the sense of time, were both 
powerfully affected. Buildings, landscapes, etc., were exhibited 
in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive. 
Space swelled, and was amplified to an extent of unutterable 
infinity. This, however, did not disturb me so much as the vast 
expansion of time. I sometimes seemed to have lived for 
seventy or one hundred years in one night; nay, sometimes had 
feelings representative of a millennium, passed in that time, or, 
however, of a duration far beyond the limits of any human 
experience (De Quincey 1960:234) 
Here De Quincey describes the way that addiction can be disturbing insofar as one 
can lose track of time. Relating back to my own materials, the theme of lostness not only 
helped to bring out the relation to the past that became central to our understanding of the 
phenomena, but that being lost in time can be the cause of a great anxiety, as seen here in this 
passage. This losing track of time is a disconnect between how we have come to know 
ourselves and our forgetting, unawareness and unthought relation to our temporality as pre-
understood for our being-in-the-world. And, what can become disturbing or a nightmare is 
how losing track of one’s past is also losing one’s sense of self. In forgetting that the past is 
what makes the present possible, and more importantly that our ability to relate to the past is 
a way of knowing ourselves through this reflexive understanding of time, that we choose to 
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make the past meaningful by reengaging our experience in relation to our sense of history 
and community can lead to disruption in our lives.  
In saying that addicts need to act like they chose addiction in order to recover, I do 
not mean to sound prescriptive. Instead, I am saying that to authentically be oneself, in the 
Heideggarian (1988) sense, it is necessary to not allow the world to (or the past) to define 
you, but rather that you act towards things, and to recognize this and act on this. For addicts, 
they must not let the addiction define who they are. This would be an act of bad faith (c.f. 
Berger and Luckmann 1966), addicts are not recognizing that they are choosing to let the 
addiction be their reality, as if it chosen for them. Instead, by restructuring their past, to see it 
as choices for which they are responsible, addicts are able to take hold of who they are now 
by reflecting on their past and reorganizing it in relation to who they no longer are and who 
they are now. For healing to happening, then, there must be forgiveness for actions in bad 
faith, and a promise to be authentic to oneself and who one is now. It is in this way that 
recovery is healing: promising to see that we each have the ability to be ourselves as we 
decide it, and acting on that possibility.  
6.2 Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Throughout this thesis I demonstrated the theoretical method of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Additionally, I stated how symbolic interaction’s conceptual orientation to 
testability failed to capture the meaning of phenomena through its epistemological 
orientation to the ontology that all knowledge is subjective. In saying that meaning is created, 
the emphasis was placed on how this process occurs, rather than on the phenomenological 
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focus on what is essential about any phenomenon that makes knowledge about it possible, 
usable, knowable, something that can be created. It is our very being in the world that allows 
us to have access to knowledge; we have the access to the mode of being of things. In order 
to see meaning, it is necessary to first recognize this a priori understanding, and then develop 
what is essential to any particular phenomenon.  
With this orientation to phenomena, the only method that can develop the essential 
nature of any phenomenon is hermeneutic phenomenology. Symbolic interaction cannot do 
this because of its interest in generalizability and process focus, taking-for-granted the access 
to meaning that we ourselves have in the very first place. Additionally, hermeneutic 
phenomenology allows for one development of any phenomenon because of the element of 
interpretation; the researcher can go anywhere she likes with the materials, as they encounter 
her. So long as the researcher stays focused on the phenomenon, the essence can be re-
imagined by engaging various materials. Lastly, because the relation is not presumed at the 
beginning of the project, as with other methods more scientifically oriented, the openness of 
the hermeneutic method allows for a creative engagement with the material when moving 
within the circle of reflexivity.  
6.3 Limitations  
In this final section I will briefly mention a few limitations of my project as well as 
where this project could possibly go in the future.  
My use of temporality and lived time, while engaged reflexively, was an 
extrapolation of Heidegger’s work on time and in fact was “fallen” by treating time as an 
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object. What Heidegger means by fallen is a tendency of theorizing to fall toward the 
perception of the object as constituted by consciousness. In other words, our looking at and 
perceiving of objects are constituting their meaning. Heidegger’s work sought to demonstrate 
how this way of looking, the dichotomy between the subject and the object, could not explain 
being, but could only explain the way that Dasein uncovers beings. This does not explain 
how we know ourselves, only how we know objects. In relation to my project, time and 
memory are imagined as objects as well as experiences that constitute the happenings of the 
present. This distinction between the two modes of time as it happens simultaneously in my 
analysis description would need to be worked through if I were to engage the Heideggarian 
work in a deeper way.  
Another limitation of my project is in the way that texts about addiction and recovery 
were taken to be mouthpieces for those very same phenomena, answers to my research 
question. This is a presumption of my study that has not been grounded, nor am I accountable 
to it. In following the Van Manen guide, this relationship to materials became apparent to 
me; this orientation towards texts as being actually about the phenomena of the inquiry is 
never in question. The Van Manen research agenda is interested in grounding the 
phenomenon, but only insofar as grounding the phenomenon within the text; it is not 
accountable to grounding the talk in the text, what are the unthought grounds of each 
particular speaker. Further development of this project could work at re-orienting to this 
notion of developing the grounds of the speakers, not being a slave to their speech (not 
assuming that they are indeed speaking about their experiences of addiction and recovery), 
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questioning their grounds and weaving a new narrative that emerges through this 
reengagement that is accountable to the grounds of their speech as well as to the phenomena 
of the inquiry. 
Finally, one further direction that I could possibly see this research going is 
developing a Heideggarian focus. Further work could address the notion of inauthenticity as 
it relates to the experience of addiction. If recovery is an action of deciding to be who one is 
and to no longer be as one once was, choosing to be authentic to the ability to choose, how is 
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